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The Urgent Need for Legal Scholarship on
Firearm Policy
DRU STEVENSON
Restrictions on federal funding for research pertaining to firearm
policy have stymied academic inquiry by social science and public
health researchers for over two decades. As a result, most researchers
agree that our public discourse about this urgent issue is woefully
under-informed, or even ill-informed, on both sides of the debate.
Legal academia, which does not operate under the same grantwriting regime as most other disciplines, can and should help fill
this gap in researching and theorizing the unresolved questions
related to firearm policy. In fact, theoretical development and
clarification from the legal academy is often a necessary antecedent
for empirical researchers in other fields to frame and develop their
own studies properly, especially about the real-world effects of
competing policy approaches to firearms. This Essay sets forth a plea
to law professors to undertake much-needed research in this area
and offers suggestions of understudied topics with low entry barriers
for legal commentators. Recommendations for interdisciplinary
collaborative efforts round out this discussion. A brief conclusion
reaches the endgame issue: ensuring access to the work we produce.
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INTRODUCTION

This Essay is a plea for more legal scholarship about gun
prevalence, gun violence, and the legal system’s response.
Public discourse on this topic suffers from a chronic dearth
of reliable data, even-handed analysis, or truly innovative
policy proposals.1
Federal law currently restricts research funding for
studies or scholarship that could somehow support “gun
control.”2 For the last twenty years—the same period when
mass shootings became an epidemic and annual gunshot
fatalities reached parity with annual traffic fatalities—the
CDC, the NIH, and other federal agencies that normally fund
research have refused to fund much-needed studies about
gun violence and gun prevalence.3 Commonly known as the
Dickey Amendment,4 the funding restriction takes the form
1. See RAND CORP., Improving Gun Policy Science, https://www.rand.org/
research/gun-policy/essays/improving-gun-policy-science.html.
2. See KRISTIN A. GOSS, DISARMED 87–89 (2006) (chronicling the CDC’s
gradual entrance into the treatment of gun violence as a public health or
epidemiological problem, and the N.R.A.’s stunningly successful maneuvers to
defund, delegitimize, and deprive federal agencies of the money or statutory
authority to conduct investigations into firearm prevalence or gun violence);
DAVID HEMENWAY, PRIVATE GUNS PUBLIC HEALTH xiv–xvi (2d ed. 2017); IGOR
VOLSKY, GUNS DOWN 116–18 (2019) (describing the funding restrictions and
arguing for the need for more research grants) Arthur L. Kellermann & Frederick
P. Rivara, Silencing the Science on Gun Research, 309 JAMA 549 (2013).
3. See Donald L. Flexner, Why the Civilian Purchase, Use, and Sale of
Assault Weapons and Semiautomatic Rifles and Pistols, Along With Large
Capacity Magazines, Should Be Banned, 20 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 593,
606 n. 76 (2017) (“One reason for the lack of research on the AWB is that the U.S.
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) which, among other things,
researches how violence affects public health, is legally prohibited from studying
the role firearms play in American deaths. After the CDC began studying gun
violence in the early 1990s, the NRA successfully lobbied for the Dickey
Amendment . . .”); Andrew J. McClurg, In Search of the Golden Mean in the Gun
Debate, 58 HOW. L.J. 779, 786 (2015) (“The National Rifle Association (NRA) and
other gun-rights advocates lobbied Congress to disband the CDC’s National
Center for Injury Prevention, the center that funded the research.”).
4. Dep’t of Health and Human Servs. Appropriations Act of 1997, Pub. L. No.
104-208, 242–44, 110 Stat. 3009 (1996).
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of an uncodified, perennial budget rider.5 The grantmaking
agencies interpret the prohibition verbiage more broadly
than most courts would,6 so that even after an Executive
Order from President Obama encouraging research about
“causes of gun violence,” and revised verbiage in the
Amendment stating the same, the grantmaking agencies
remain reticent,7 funding only a handful of research projects
at major universities, compared to hundreds of grants for
trendier topics.8 Prominent statisticians and other analysts
have recently decried the unreliability and instability of the
data provided by the CDC about firearm incidents9—but

5. Former Congressman Jay Dickey, the amendment’s namesake, now
regrets placing restrictions on gun violence research, writing in an op-ed that
“scientific research helped reduce the U.S. motor vehicle death rate and save
hundreds of thousands of lives - all without getting rid of cars.” Jay Dickey &
Mark Rosenburg, Time for Collaboration on Gun Studies, WASH. POST (Jan. 24,
2016), archive.commercialappeal.com/opinion/analysis/jay-dickey-and-markrosenberg-time-for-collaboration-on-gun-studies-27fc4279-5045-04ca-e0530100007f-366283301.html (calling for significant increases in funding for
research on means of preventing gun violence).
6. See Allen Rostrond, A New State Ice Age for Gun Policy, 10 HARV. L. &
POL’Y REV. 327, 359 (2016) (“Although the amendment merely prohibited studies
that advocate or promote gun control and therefore did not necessarily block all
funding of research on gun violence, the amendment and related threats to slash
CDC’s budget were a ‘shot fired across the bow’ that intimidated researchers and
deterred CDC from supporting any work that might be perceived as antigun.”).
7. See Marian E. Betz, et al., Frozen Funding on Firearm Research: Doing
Nothing Is No Longer an Acceptable Solution, 17 WEST. J. EMERG. MED 91 (2016).
8. See Sandro Galea, et al., Priorities in Recovering From a Lost Generation
of Firearms Research, 108 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 858 (2018), https://ajph.
aphapublications.org/doi/pdf/10.2105/AJPH.2018.304436; Jonathan M. Metzl,
Repeal the Dickey Amendment to Address Polarization Surrounding Firearms in
the United States, 108 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 864 (2018), https://ajph.
aphapublications.org/doi/pdf/10.2105/AJPH.2018.304461; Allen Rostron, The
Dickey Amendment on Federal Funding for Research on Gun Violence: A Legal
Dissection, 108 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 865 (2018), https://ajph.aphapublications.org/
doi/pdf/10.2105/AJPH.2018.304450.
9. See HEMENWAY, supra note 2, at xiv (describing the National Violent
Death Reporting System (NVDRS) and the limitations due to its being
unavailable in many states); see also Sean Campbell & Daniel Nass, 11 Senators
Want To Know Why The CDC’s Gun Injury Estimates Are Unreliable,
FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Mar. 29, 2019, 4:00 PM), https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/
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remember, the CDC continues to work with funding
restraints on this subject. Due to similar statutory
constraints, ATF data about firearms used in crimes are
unavailable to researchers as well.10
Historically, law professors have left most of the
empirical research about the effects of laws and policies to
their counterparts in the social sciences: sociologists,
economists, decision theorists, forensic psychologists,
statisticians, and political science professors. Of course,
there are exceptions and a modest trend toward empirical
legal scholarship, but many of these projects either rely upon
useful research from these other disciplines or have a coauthor from those disciplines. In the area of firearm
regulations, such research is missing. Unlike law professors,
research faculty in these other disciplines depend heavily on
grants to fund their research projects—it is an entrenched
part of the business model for these departments in the
universities, as well as for think tanks and similar
opportunities for academicians in non-law fields.
A categorical funding ban effectively shifts research to
other topics, even for graduate students making their initial
selection of a dissertation topic, and subsequent path
dependence reinforces the funding disincentives. Compared
to other policy issues of our time, these leave a substantial
gap in research and available data. “Thus, much knowledge
about firearms is lacking—there are few longitudinal data
sets that have asked questions about firearms to help
determine the risks and benefits of a gun in the home, or gun
11-senators-want-to-know-why-the-cdcs-gun-injury-estimates-are-unreliable;
Sean Campbell & Daniel Nass, The CDC’s Gun Injury Data Is Becoming Even
Less Reliable, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Mar. 11, 2019), https://fivethirtyeight.com/
features/this-years-cdc-gun-injury-data-is-even-less-reliable-than-last-years;
Sean Campbell, Daniel Nass & Mai Nguyen, The CDC Is Publishing Unreliable
Data On Gun Injuries; People Are Using It Anyway, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Oct. 4,
2018, 5:58 AM), https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/the-cdc-is-publishingunreliable-data-on-gun-injuries-people-are-using-it-anyway.
10. See HEMENWAY, supra note 2, at xv.
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carrying, over time.”11 The RAND Corporation in 2018
conducted a thorough review of the academic literature
addressing the effects of gun prevalence and regulation (from
child-safety locks to waiting periods, and from background
checks to taxation of firearms or ammunition)12—and
concluded that there remained insufficient support for or
against every gun policy except one.13 RAND places the
blame for this dearth of empirical research mostly on the
Dickey Amendment (I will return below to what RAND and
others are trying to do about this).14 Legislators, regulators,
and other policymakers operate under a veil of mandated
ignorance about which policies are effective, and which are
counterproductive. The National Academy of Sciences
reached a similar conclusion in its overview of the extant
empirical research in 2013: “Additionally, the lack of
comprehensive datasets and the wide variety of sources and
the fact that the data lead to contradictory conclusions call
into question the reliability and validity of gun-violence
data.”15

11. Id.
12. See RAND CORP., More Research Could Help Prevent Gun Violence in
America (July 10, 2018), https://www.rand.org/blog/rand-review/2018/07/moreresearch-could-help-prevent-gun-violence-in-america.html.
13. See id.
14. See id. In the mid-1990s, Congress zeroed out the budget for gun violence
prevention at the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) after some
of its studies linked home gun ownership with higher rates of firearm deaths.
Congress also prohibited the use of federal research funding to promote gun
control. The CDC has since interpreted that rule, advocated by the National Rifle
Association (NRA) and known as the Dickey Amendment, as an outright ban on
most gun research. That has left mostly private foundations and universities to
search for evidence about what works and what doesn’t to prevent gun violence.
Without government support, they also work without much government data.
Researchers wanting to follow trends in gun ownership rates, for example, have
had to try to estimate those numbers from hunting permits, firearm suicide rates,
even subscriptions to Guns & Ammo magazine.
15. THE INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE AND THE NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL,
PRIORITIES FOR RESEARCH TO REDUCE THE THREAT OF FIREARM-RELATED VIOLENCE
9 (Alan I. Leshner et al. eds. 2013). The report continues: “The predominant use
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It gets worse. In many fields, the private corporate sector
contributes to the advancement of knowledge through its
own research and development, or through partnering with
university researchers, such as the partnerships in the hard
sciences between university laboratories and the
pharmaceutical, agribusiness, and oil companies. In terms of
research about injuries and fatalities, the insurance industry
conducts extensive actuarial and statistical research, both
internally and externally, so that they can price their policies
based on accurate assessments of risk—the likelihood and
seriousness of foreseeable incidents and mishaps. For
example, every year the nine largest providers of legal
malpractice insurance collectively hire Ames & Gough, a risk
consulting firm, to study the trends in legal malpractice
payouts (many of which occur extrajudicially and would
otherwise be undiscoverable).16 They provide a detailed
report to the industry’s leaders about the types of attorney
mistakes or misconduct that generate the most claims, and
the largest claims, as well as other trends in the size of
payouts, the most hazardous areas of practice, precautionary
suggestions, and so forth.17 Such research is informative and
useful, not only for insurers and their policyholders (the law
firms), but also for the academy, for state bar ethics
committees, and for the judiciary. The Ames & Gough
studies also challenge some of the American Bar
Association’s own research about these same questions,
which draws from entirely different data sources.18

of research study designs that have limited ability to study causality, like casecontrol and ecological studies that aggregate data from sources and levels, have
compounded the challenge faced by researchers and policy makers alike.” Id. at
10. See also id. at 55 (describing how the lack of federal research funding has
delayed the development of various gun safety features, such as “smart guns.”).
16. See Ames & Gough, LPLI 2018 Claims Survey: Legal Malpractice Claims
Increase in Severity and Scope as Firms Adapt to Market Realities.
17. Id.
18. See AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, PROFILE OF LEGAL MALPRACTICE CLAIMS:
2012–2015 (2016).
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No such studies about insurance claims or payouts are
available regarding firearm injuries. Federal statutes
currently provide immunity from liability for gun
manufacturers19 in most cases. This statutory immunity
preempts state tort law. Thus, insurers have little incentive
to expend resources investigating the causes or trends in
firearm injuries, as do firearm manufacturers. Private-sector
funding is missing in this area, especially compared to other
products and services that are susceptible to liability claims.
On the government side, there is little or no internal
research by federal agencies themselves—even by the
agencies that normally study and regulate health and
safety.20 Firearms and ammunition are not subject to the
same safety testing or risk assessment that the Consumer
Products Safety Commission conducts (and publishes) for
virtually every other consumer item,21 or that the FDA
conducts for pharmaceuticals and medical devices, or that
the EPA would demand for pesticides and fungicides, or the
manufacturing specifications the NHTSA requires for
automobiles. No other product on the market causes as many
deaths of both consumers and innocent bystanders while
having no federal regulations requiring safety features,
warning labels, or manufacturing specifications.22

19. See Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act, Pub. L. No. 109-92, 119
Stat. 2095 (2005) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 7901–7903 (2012). See
Soto v. Bushmaster Firearms Int’l, 202 A.3d 262 (Conn. 2019) for an important
recent court decision regarding this statute. See also VOLSKY, supra note 2, at 90–
91 (describing history and consequences of PLCAA).
20. See Olivia Li, Cars, Toys, and Aspirin Have to Meet Mandatory Safety
Standards. Guns Don’t. Here’s Why, THE TRACE (Jan. 19, 2016), https://
www.thetrace.org/2016/01/gun-safety-standards/.
21. See PHILIP J. COOK & KRISTIN A. GOSS, THE GUN DEBATE: WHAT EVERYONE
NEEDS TO KNOW 123–24 (2014) (describing statutory exclusions for guns from
consumer product safety regulations).
22. See VOLKSY, supra note 2, at 94–96. Volsky explains the increasing
problem with this information deficit: “The truth is, such oversight is more
important now than ever before. Firearm manufacturers, in an effort to improve
market share, are producing new products and militarized firearm accessories
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Statutorily, the Consumer Product Safety Commission
cannot conduct any research about guns, for example,
whether a certain model is prone to accidental discharge.23
N.R.A.-backed legislators ensured that the agency entrusted
with reviewing accidental injuries and fatalities from
consumer products could not evaluate the safety of any
firearms or ammunition.24
The legal academy is ideally situated to make valuable
contributions to the public discourse about firearms.
Professors at American law schools have an atypical degree
of freedom to research and write about whatever we want—
we normally do not have to apply for grants or special
funding for our research. Most law schools provide summer
writing stipends to their faculty (with complete freedom to
pick any law-related topic of research), as well as research
sabbaticals, reduced teaching loads, and federally-funded
research assistants (work study recipients do not, as far as I
know, have to report or disclose what subjects they
researched for their respective professors).
We could, and should, help fill the gap in the research
about gun violence, gun prevalence, and effective regulatory
responses. We are fully funded researchers who can select
our own research agendas. There is an urgent need for
rigorous empirical research in this area, which a growing
number of law professors know how to do. There is also an
that may actually be making guns more dangerous. These changes are designed
to excite an already saturated consumer base as gun ownership rates are
shrinking and the gun supply is increasingly concentrated in the hands of fewer
people.” Id. at 95.
23. See Consumer Product Safety Commission Improvements Act of 1976,
Pub. L. 94-284, § 3(e), 90 Stat. 504 (1976) provided that: “The Consumer Product
Safety Commission shall make no ruling or order that restricts the manufacture
or sale of firearms, firearms ammunition, or components of firearms ammunition,
including black powder or gunpowder for firearms.” See also COOK & GOSS, supra
note 21, at 123–24; VOLSKY, supra note 2, at 94–96.
24. See GOSS, supra note 2, at 78–79 (describing the legislative maneuvering
in the 1970s to ensure that there would be no federal safety specifications or
regulations for firearms or ammunition); VOLKSY, supra note 2, at 93–96.
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urgent need for scholarship that utilizes more of the
traditional toolbox of law professors—precisely defining
crucial terms, delineating necessary exceptions to otherwise
general rules, drafting model legislation, and drawing on the
wealth of analogous research we already have on effective
licensing and permitting policies, excise taxes, industrial
reporting requirements, consumer protection, and so on.
Given the situation with funding prohibitions on other
disciplines, those of us in the legal academy have a civic duty
to make guns a higher priority in our research agendas. A
few professors have recently made significant contributions
on this topic, such as John Donahue,25 Fredrick Vars,26
Joseph Blocher,27 and Darrell Miller.28 Nevertheless, there is
much more to do, and many more who could make valuable
contributions to the scholarship.
Apart from our own scholarly endeavors, many of us
advise law review editors about potential symposium topics;
we give students in our seminar courses suggestions for their
paper topics; and we mentor junior faculty in their earlycareer research. Those of us who supervise the student25. See generally John J. Donohue, Abhay Aneja, & Kyle D. Weber, Right‐to‐
Carry Laws and Violent Crime: A Comprehensive Assessment Using Panel Data
and a State‐Level Synthetic Control Analysis, 16 J. EMPIR. LEG. STUD. 198 (2019).
26. Angela Selvaggio & Fredrick E. Vars, “Bind Me More Tightly Still”:
Voluntary Restraint Against Gun Suicide, 53 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 671 (2016); see
generally Fredrick E. Vars, Not Young Guns Anymore: Dementia and the Second
Amendment, 25 ELDER L.J. 51 (2017); Fredrick E. Vars, Self-Defense Against Gun
Suicide, 56 B.C. L. REV. 1465 (2015).
27. See JOSEPH BLOCHER & DARRELL A. H. MILLER, THE POSITIVE SECOND
AMENDMENT: RIGHTS, REGULATION, AND THE FUTURE OF HELLER (2018); Joseph
Blocher, Firearm Localism, 123 YALE L.J. 82 (2013); Joseph Blocher & Darrell A.
H. Miller, Lethality, Public Carry, and Adequate Alternatives, 53 HARV. J. LEGIS.
279 (2016); Joseph Blocher & Darrell A. H. Miller, What is Gun Control? Direct
Burdens, Incidental Burdens, and the Boundaries of the Second Amendment, 83
U. CHI. L. REV. 295 (2016); Eric Ruben & Joseph Blocher, From Theory to
Doctrine: An Empirical Analysis of the Right to Keep and Bear Arms After Heller,
67 DUKE L.J. 1433 (2018).
28. See Darrell A. H. Miller, Text, History, and Tradition: What the Seventh
Amendment Can Teach Us About the Second, 122 Yale L.J. 852 (2013).
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edited journals at our law schools should encourage them to
accept or solicit more (serious) articles in this area. When our
counterparts in the social sciences do in fact publish
scholarship in their peer-review journals, their publications
are not available to the public free of charge—the peerreview journals usually make online readers purchase the
article for an unreasonable fee. In the legal academy, many
of us post our manuscripts on the Social Science Research
Network (freely available to the public), in addition to
publishing them in law reviews. We have more freedom to
make our research available to the public than those in other
disciplines, and the public needs better information about
guns and gun policy. Many law professors have widely read
blogs; almost none of them blog about this.
In the following section, Part II, I lay out some areas that
would be particularly well-suited for research and
commentary by law professors. Of course, there are many
angles from which we could, and hopefully will, approach the
complex problem of pervasive gun violence, which includes
suicides. I suggest three areas that should have low entry
barriers for those in the legal academy.
First, taxation of firearms and ammunition is a
surprisingly neglected subject in the legal literature, and
there is little understanding of the current excise tax regime
inside or outside of the legal academy. Yet there are many
law professors who have expertise in excise taxes, sales
taxes, use taxes, and special corporate tax penalties, and
could easily apply that expertise to the firearm and
ammunition industry. Tax professors are also familiar with
some of the thornier issues of tax policy—the effects of excise
or sales taxes on secondary markets (legal or illegal),
elasticity of consumer demand, Pigouvian tax theory,
Tiboutian theory of competitive tax regimes, tax compliance
and enforcement, and the legislative process for modifying
an existing tax regime, which is distinct from other
legislative enactments.
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The other two suggested starting points for legal
academia are difficult definitional or conceptual issues:
legitimate “defensive gun use,”29 which goes to the heart of
the tradeoffs with gun prevalence, and state preemption
laws,30 which prohibit municipalities from having local
ordinances about firearm sales, storage, or use.31 The RAND
researchers have singled out this former point as a consistent
problem with sorting the existing data32—statistics about
incidents where guns “saved lives” or stopped a criminal
unfortunately include criminals themselves using guns
defensively against rival criminals, incidents where gun
owners misperceive an imaginary threat and immediately
resort to lethal force, and in gun owners who merely imagine
that the guns in their possession probably deterred would-be
criminals from ever attempting a crime in the first place.33 It
is important to develop a workable, legally precise definition
of the operative terms before researchers can accurately
evaluate the incidence or importance of defensive gun use. In
other words, scholars familiar with the law of self-defense or
defense of others, which includes numerous exceptions and
limitations, could put that expertise to effective use in
helping create a consensus about how to categorize incidents
as one where a firearm saved the day.34 Firearms present a
host of fascinating, and poorly understood, legal issues
besides the constitutional questions (mostly centered around
29. RAND CORP., THE SCIENCE OF GUN POLICY: A CRITICAL SYNTHESIS OF
RESEARCH EVIDENCE ON THE EFFECTS OF GUN POLICIES IN THE UNITED STATES 273–
87 (2018); see generally BLOCHER & MILLER, supra note 27, at 152–54; COOK &
GOSS, supra note 21, at 17–19.
30. See GOSS, supra note 2, at 162–65 (describing the preemption movement
as an N.R.A. strategy).
31. See BLOCHER & MILLER, supra note 27, at 189–90.
32. See RAND, supra note 29, at 274–80.
33. See COOK & GOSS, supra note 21, at 19–20 (discussing the problems with
survey data in this area, due to respondents’ skewed perceptions).
34. See id. at 19 (“More fundamentally, what constitutes a legitimate DGU
may be a matter of definition.”).
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the Second Amendment and the judicial gloss it received in
Heller).
Part III serves to familiarize academic readers with some
encouraging new initiatives that bear on scholarly
productivity,35 such as the new National Collaborative on
Gun Violence Research, which parallels and echoes the
points I set forth in this piece, and the newly-established
Center for Firearms Law at Duke Law School. The former
commenced in 2018 with a generous grant by the Laura and
John Arnold Foundation, and is a clearinghouse for new
research on gun violence.36 While the Collaborative is
administered under the auspices and oversight of the RAND
Corporation, the Arnold Foundation has pledged to provide
generous funding to support the facilitation of conducting
high-quality gun violence research.37 I have three main
reasons for introducing readers to this specific project. First,
the website is a great launching pad for researchers new to
this area.38 It provides a balanced survey of the existing
literature on various subtopics in the field and identifies
many key areas for future research. In addition, the website
can familiarize legal scholars with the terminology and
nomenclatures essential to firearm research, and quickly get
readers up to speed on the “knowns and unknowns” of gun
policy. Second, some legal scholars would be good candidates
for the Collective’s proposed projects—I believe that if more
law professors were familiar with the type of scholars and

35. For a recent overview of private funding to fill in some of the gap created
by the federal statutory restrictions, see Margot Sanger-Katz, Gun Research is
Suddenly Hot, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 17, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/17/
upshot/gun-research-is-suddenly-hot.html.
36. See Andrew R. Morral, Press Release, Gun Violence Research
Collaborative to Release First Request for Research Proposals in January, Names
Advisory Committee (Nov. 15, 2018), https://www.rand.org/news/press/ 2018/11/
15.html.
37. Id.
38. See generally NATIONAL COLLABORATIVE ON GUN VIOLENCE RESEARCH,
https://www.ncgvr.org (last visited Oct. 19, 2019).
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researchers the Collective is seeking right now, they might
be interested in applying. Third, the Collective’s focus on
empirical research will often be complementary to, rather
than duplicative of, the work that law professors do, but this
type of interrelationship is useful and important.
Additionally, the Duke Center for Firearms Law has
amassed an extremely helpful repository of historical gun
laws that is searchable by state39—a terrific resource for
scholars writing in this area. Part III also includes a brief
response to assertions by John Lott, a well-known advocate
for increasing gun prevalence, that the curtailment of federal
research funds is a “myth.”
My brief Conclusion urges the legal academy to seek to
remedy the underlying cause of the problem that has
prompted this Essay—that is, we need to repeal (or more
properly, remove) the Dickey Amendment from future
budget bills. In the meantime, I urge both authors and law
review editors alike to make special efforts to disseminate
the research in this area without cost to the public, following
the example of some of the most prestigious law review
journals by providing digital archives on the journal’s
website.40 In some cases, this may affect decisions about
where or how to publish one’s final work, or at least could be
an added provision to the publication agreements we have
with law reviews. This part of my proposal also encourages
more law professors who have high-readership blogs to direct
readers’ attention to high-quality emerging scholarship
about gun policy. Finally, I would encourage more law
professors to participate in legislative drafting and lobbying
projects—a crucial last step that the RAND-affiliated

39. REPOSITORY OF HISTORICAL GUN LAWS, https://law.duke.edu/gunlaws/.
40. See, e.g., STANFORD LAW REVIEW ONLINE, https://www.stanfordlawreview
.org/online-archive/ (last visited Oct. 19, 2019); UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW
REVIEW PRINT EDITION, https://www.pennlawreview.com/print/ (last visited Oct.
19, 2019); YALE LAW JOURNAL FORUM, https://www.yalelawjournal.org/forum (last
visited Oct. 19, 2019).
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researchers are unlikely to do.
A final note before proceeding to the next section: I will
not take space here to recount the sickening series of mass
shootings in recent years, or the general prevalence of gun
homicides and suicides every year, as my readers must
already be aware of this and other articles have covered
these grounds in detail.41 Nor will I spend any time decrying
the National Rifle Association, or trying to convince readers
of the organization’s wealth and political influence, which
seems excessively obvious. My goal is to wake up the legal
academy to the special role that law professors can, and
must, have in elevating the public discourse about guns
despite the current stalemate.
II. THREE UNDERSTUDIED SUBJECTS
This section sets forth three areas that would be
particularly well-suited for research and commentary by law
professors, though this is only a start—the RAND website
has a much longer list of topics that desperately need more
scholarly research. I selected these three because they are
areas that should have low entry barriers for those in the
legal academy—they draw on the legal academician’s current
knowledge base—and because they present issues that might
prove more difficult or unfamiliar to researchers in other
social science disciplines.
A. Taxation
Taxation of firearms or ammunition comes up in
proposals (academic and non-academic) for controlling gun
violence, but there is little or no discussion in the legal
academic literature about the current tax regime that is
already in place, how well it is working, or whether
41. This is also not another essay about assault rifles; personally, I believe
handguns are a much bigger problem in our society, and that handguns are no
more useful, necessary, or justifiable than rifles.
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incremental modifications to the current tax framework
would make a difference. Moreover, taxation has enjoyed an
upswing in popularity in the last few years as a regulatory
experiment for reducing gun violence, with states and
municipalities taking initiative.42 Legal challenges are
underway and are already reaching the appellate courts—
unfortunately, without a sturdy base of academic
theorization of the issues involved.
Unsurprisingly, the firearms industry “opposes any
legislation that would raise taxes on the sale of firearms and
ammunition.”43 The industry has three main arguments for
their position: 1) given that bearing arms is a constitutional
right, taxing the activity constitutes an unconstitutional poll
tax; 2) criminals would not pay the taxes anyway, so the
burden would fall entirely on law-abiding gun purchasers
and would not reduce criminal gun use; and 3) the tax puts
the jurisdiction at a competitive disadvantage, as purchasers
will buy from other nontax jurisdictions, hurting local gun
retailers and reducing tax revenue for the jurisdiction from
their business tax.44 The constitutional argument (that gun
taxes are a poll tax) merits further academic inquiry, but
facially, it appears the Heller rubric permits at least the
existing taxes on guns and ammunition.45 The local business

42. Rachel Bade, New Gun Control Strategy: Tax ‘Em, POLITICO (Apr. 9, 2013),
https://www.politico.com/story/2013/04/guns-bullets-taxes-gun-control-tool089782; Keith Wagstaff, Are High Taxes an Effective Form of Gun Control?, THE
WEEK (Apr. 9, 2013), https://theweek.com/articles/465774/are-high-taxesfirearms-effective-form-gun-control.
43. Unintended Consequences of Firearm and Ammunition Taxes, NATIONAL
SHOOTING SPORTS FOUNDATION, https://www3.nssf.org/share/factsheets/PDF/
FirearmsTaxes.pdf (last visited Oct. 19, 2019). The NSSF is the trade association
of the gun industry.
44. See id.
45. Hannah E. Shearer & Allison S. Anderman, Analyzing Gun-ViolencePrevention Taxes Under Emerging Firearm Fee Jurisprudence, 43 S. ILL. U. L.J.
157, 171–73 (2018) (discussing the court opinions to date upholding the
constitutionality of gun taxes); see Blocher & Miller, supra note 27, at 335 (“If
liability for negligence with a weapon, taxes on ammunition, or storage
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burden is dependent, of course, on how localized the
hypothetical tax would be. This could merely be an argument
for federal versus state taxes, and state/regional taxes versus
municipal. The second point brings up the complex issue of
the price relationship between legal markets and black
markets, discussed in the following paragraphs.
The federal tax regime for firearms is longstanding,
unchanging, and outdated. Firearm manufacturers pay a ten
percent tax, called the Firearms and Ammunition Excise Tax
(FAET), on every handgun produced, and eleven percent on
ammunition and other firearms, such as hunting rifles.46 A
separate statute, the National Firearms Act,47 places a $200
manufacturer tax on each machine gun or short-barrel
shotgun produced or imported, a figure unchanged since its
enactment in 1934.48 The manufacturers and importers pay
these taxes, so presumably they factor into the retail price
that consumers pay for a gun purchase. The Treasury
Department’s Alcohol and Tobacco Tax and Trade Bureau
(TTB) has administered FAET, the tax on most guns and
ammunition, since the Homeland Security reforms of 2002–
2003.49 The revenue collected goes to the Fish and Wildlife
Commission, which holds it in a trust account administered
on behalf of the states to support hunting and conservation

requirements for weapons are historically indicated, then they cannot be
‘infringements,’ because there is no corresponding right.”).
46. 26 U.S.C. § 4181 (2012) (also known as the Pittman-Robertson Act of
1919); see also FAET REFERENCE GUIDE FIREARMS AND AMMUNITION EXCISE TAX,
https://www.ttb.gov/firearms/reference_guide.shtml (last visited Oct. 19, 2019)
(publication of the Alcohol and Tobacco Tax and Trade Bureau of the Department
of the Treasury) [hereinafter “FAET Reference Guide”].
47. 26 U.S.C. § 5811 (2012).
48. See id. The Supreme Court rejected constitutional challenges to the
National Firearms Act in United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174 (1939) and
Sonzinsky v. United States, 300 U.S. 506 (1937). For a post-Heller decision
upholding the NFA, see United States v. Cox, 906 F.3d 1170, 1178–88 (2018).
49. See FAET Reference Guide, supra note 46, at Section I.A.
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activities.50 The FAET generated over $761 million in
revenue in 2017.51 The NFA taxes on machine guns,
silencers, and so forth, generates less than one-tenth of that
amount, and revenues go to the general treasury fund.52
These constitute the entirety of the federal taxation regime
for firearms and ammunition, besides the $90 annual
licensing fee paid by authorized gun dealers.53 A bill
currently moving through Congress, the Gun Violence and
Safe Communities Act, would raise the FAET rates to 20
percent on guns and 50 percent on ammunition.54
In recent years, two municipalities have imposed local
taxes imposing a $25 tax on every firearm: Cook County, IL55
and Seattle, WA.56 As of 2016, Seattle also has a tax (up to
five cents per round) on ammunition.57 Both of these local
taxes were primarily for generating revenue;58 Seattle’s tax
has already survived a court challenge.59 Pennsylvania adds
a $3 surcharge on guns subject to the state sales tax,60 and

50. Id.
51. R. ELIOT CRAFTON, JANE G. GRAVELLE & WILLIAM J. KROUSE, CONG.
RESEARCH SERV., GUNS, EXCISE TAXES, WILDLIFE RESTORATION, AND THE NATIONAL
FIREARMS ACT 1 (2018).
52. Id. at 7.
53. See id. at 7–8 (discussing the Gun Control Act of 1968, especially 18 U.S.C.
§§ 921 et seq).
54. H.R. 5103, 115th Cong. § 2(a) (2018) (sponsored by Rep. Danny Davis (DIL)).
55. COOK COUNTY FIREARM AND FIREARM AMMUNITION TAX, https://www.cook
countyil.gov/service/firearm-and-firearm-ammunition-tax (last visited Oct. 19,
2019).
56. RAND, supra note 29, at 241 (discussing firearm and ammunition taxes).
57. Id. at 241.
58. See id.; see also Robert McClelland, New Gun and Ammo Taxes Sound
Like Promising Ways To Reduce Gun Violence. But There Are Problems, TAXVOX
(May 24, 2018), https://www.taxpolicycenter.org/taxvox/new-gun-and-ammotaxes-sound-promising-ways-reduce-gun-violence-there-are-problems.
59. Watson v. Seattle, 401 P.3d 1, 14 (Wash. 2017).
60. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6111.2 (2019).
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Tennessee has a ten-cent excise tax on shotgun shells.61 A
federal judge struck down a statute in the Northern Mariana
Islands that imposed a $1,000 gun tax in 2016.62 Local tax
experiments are rare because most states now have statutes
that preempt such initiatives by municipalities.63 There is
zero scholarship to date on Tieboutian competition with local
excise taxes of firearms.
It is unknown how much taxes reduce gun violence or
inhibit gun purchases, but this is an important question to
answer. As RAND researchers put it in 2018,
“[u]nderstanding the potential consequences of higher taxes
on guns and ammunition is important both for policy
considerations moving forward and for assessing laws that
increase the effective price of legal gun purchases, such as
permit-to-purchase law.”64 This is mostly a question of
elasticity or price sensitivity among purchasers—a subject
heavily studied in other areas of taxation, but not with guns.
The RAND report explains the frustrating lack of data and
61. TENN. CODE ANN. § 70-1-401 (2019).
62. Murphy v. Guerrero, No. 1:14-CV-00026, 2016 WL 5508998 (D. N. Mar. I.
Sept. 28. 2016) (striking down most of C.N.M.I. Public Law 19-42).
63. See Richard Briffault, The Challenge of the New Preemption, 70 STAN. L.
REV. 1995, 1997–99 (2018); see also Blocher, Firearm Localism, supra note 27, at
133. For some older empirical research on gun sale interactions across different
locales, see Anthony A. Braga, Garen J. Wintemute, Glenn L. Pierce, Philip J.
Cook, & Greg Ridgeway, Interpreting the Empirical Evidence on Illegal Gun
Market Dynamics, 89 J. URB. HEALTH 779 (2012) (finding that “criminals rely
upon a diverse set of illegal diversion pathways to acquire guns, gun traffickers
usually divert small numbers of guns, newer guns are diverted through close-toretail diversions from legal firearms commerce, and that a diverse set of gun
trafficking indicators are needed to identify and shut down gun trafficking
pathways.”); Leo H. Kahane, Understanding the Interstate Export of Crime Guns:
A Gravity Model Approach, 31 CONTEMP. ECON. POL’Y 618 (2012); Daniel W.
Webster, Jon S. Vernick, & Maria T. Bulzacchelli, Effects of State-Level Firearm
Seller Accountability Policies on Firearm Trafficking, 86 J. URB. HEALTH 525
(2009); see also Philip J. Cook, Jens Ludwig, Sudhir A. Venkatesh & Anthony A.
Braga, Underground Gun Markets, 117 ECON. J. F588 (2007); Philip J. Cook,
Stephanie Molliconi & Thomas B. Cole, Regulating Gun Markets, 86 J. CRIM. L.
& CRIMINOLOGY 59, 88–90 (1995).
64. RAND, supra note 29, at 241.

2019]

SCHOLARSHIP ON FIREARM POLICY

1467

research:
Several factors complicate evaluation of the price sensitivity of
demand for guns or ammunition. First, because few policy changes
have substantially influenced the price of firearms or ammunition,
research has faced insufficient variation to empirically estimate the
price responsiveness of various participants in gun markets.
Second, in the absence of exogenous price shocks, researchers
cannot disentangle changes in consumer demand that are driven by
changes in price from changes in price that are driven by changes
in consumer demand. And third, the market for firearms and
ammunition is highly differentiated, and there are no publicly
available gun or ammunition price data over a sufficient period to
support policy analysis. A few sources provided information on
national average prices of guns and ammunition, but these
averages obscured notable price variation across jurisdictions and
offered only a rough approximation of the retail prices facing
consumers. Thus, these data have generally been used to evaluate
how demand shocks influence prices and not to estimate how
responsive consumers are to changes in prices. 65

In addition, there is uncertainty about the effects that
taxation have on both legal secondary markets (private sales
between acquaintances) and black markets. In theory, price
increases in a primary legal market (for any item) should
affect both secondary markets and black markets—driving
up prices there as well—but we need more research to
quantify this. For example, news reports suggest that new
firearm sales plummeted in Seattle after the impositions of
its $25 tax,66 which almost certainly contributed to the
disappointing revenue compared to earlier projections, but
there is a correlation-causation problem. It is unclear
whether gun ownership declined, or if purchasers shifted to
private individual sales, or shifted out of town.67 RAND’s
65. Id. at 242.
66. Dan Springer, Seattle Gun Tax Failure? Firearm Sales Plummet, Violence
Spikes After Law Passes, FOX NEWS (June 15, 2017) https://www.foxnews.com/
politics/seattle-gun-tax-failure-firearm-sales-plummet-violence-spikes-after-law
-passes.
67. Joseph R. Buoscio Jr., Violence Taxes: New Way to Recoup and Prevent the
Costs of Gun Violence? Or New Method to Destroy Business and Competitiveness?,
15 DEPAUL BUS. & COM. L.J. 81 (2016) (arguing that local taxes merely drive
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report states that a few empirical studies suggest that
hunters are relatively insensitive to increases in license
fees,68 only one of the three articles they cite appears to be
an empirical study,69 and finds inelasticity only for American
hunters wealthy enough to travel abroad for hunting
trips70—the other two are purely theoretical models.71 In
contrast, the Seattle experiment suggests that many other
purchasers are sensitive to gun price increases. As the RAND
report concludes, “[o]verall, we currently have little
empirical evidence to indicate how taxation would influence
firearm-related outcomes, such as violent crime or suicides.
Nor is there evidence establishing how taxing firearms or
ammunition would affect the gun industry, defensive gun
use, or recreational gun use.”72
As of the date of this writing, I could find only three
published law review articles focusing on this topic,73 none of
purchasers to other locales or to Internet sellers).
68. RAND, supra note 29, at 243.
69. Lili Sun, G. Cornelis Van Kooten, & Graham M. Voss, Demand for Wildlife
Hunting in British Columbia, 53 CAN. J. AGRIC. ECON. 25 (2005) (empirical study
suggesting that hunting licenses charged by foreign jurisdictions on American
hunters visiting there are insensitive to price but vary instead on U.S. income
fluctuations).
70. See id.
71. Neelam Poudyal, Seong Hoon Cho & J. M. Bowker, Demand for Resident
Hunting in the Southeastern United States, 13 HUM. DIMENSIONS WILDLIFE 158
(2008) (positing, through modeling rather than empirical study, that hunters
have a margin of inelasticity to license fee increases); Mario F. Teisl, Kevin J.
Boyle & Richard E. Record Jr., License‐Sales Revenues: Understanding Angler
and Hunter Reactions to Changes in License Prices, 4 HUM. DIMENSIONS WILDLIFE
1, 1–2 (1999) (suggesting that across-the-board increases in hunting license fees
is a less strategic way to generate state revenue than fees tailored to the
individual hunter’s price sensitivity).
72. RAND, supra note 29, at 243.
73. Buoscio, supra note 67, at 83; Shearer & Anderman, supra note 45, at 157
(concluding that most proposed gun-violence-prevention taxes are
constitutional); see generally Asha Rangappa, The Cost of Freedom: Using the Tax
Power to Limit Personal Arsenals, 32 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. INTER ALIA 17 (Sept.
23, 2013, 2:15 PM), https://ylpr.yale.edu/inter_alia/cost-freedom-using-tax-power
-limit-personal-aresenals; Allison Speaker, Excise Taxes on a Fundamental
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which are empirical or even theoretically rigorous (they are
advocacy or “idea” pieces); an additional forthcoming article
proposes a firearm tax to fund a victim’s compensation
fund.74 One published article devotes a section to ridiculing
Pigouvian taxes on firearms.75 The dearth of high-quality
research or academic commentary is unfortunate, given the
number of law professors who have specialized knowledge in
excise taxes, sales taxes, use taxes, and special corporate tax
penalties—all of which could be transferrable, to some
extent, to firearm sales and manufacturing.
Tax salience is a subject that has far-reaching
implications for gun policy, and a rich academic literature
has developed in the last decade on salience in other areas of
taxation.76 As noted above, the historic pattern for firearm

Right: Do Excise Taxes on Firearms Survive in a Post-Heller World?, 26 GEO.
MASON U. CIV. RTS. L.J. 317 (2016). Additionally, from outside the law review
sphere, one non-empirical economics article attempts to model some of the effects,
but reaches extremely tentative conclusions. Isaac Ehrlich & Tetsuya Saito,
Taxing Guns vs. Taxing Crime: An Application of the “Market for Offenses Model”,
32 J. POL’Y MODELING 670, 671, 687–89 (2010).
74. See also Samuel D. Brunson, Paying for Gun Violence, 104 Minn. L. Rev.
(forthcoming), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3256473.
75. Victor Fleischer, Curb Your Enthusiasm for Pigovian Taxes, 68 VAND. L.
REV. 1673, 1677–78 (2015).
76. On salience and taxation, see John Brooks, Brian Galle & Brendan Maher,
Cross-Subsidies: Government’s Hidden Pocketbook, 106 GEO. L.J. 1229, 1266–68
(2018); Raj Chetty, Adam Looney, & Kory Kroft, Salience and Taxation: Theory
and Evidence, 99 AM. ECON. REV. 1145, 1145–46 (2009) (arguing that tax salience
impacts elasticity of demand); Amy Finkelstein, E-ZTax: Tax Salience and Tax
Rates, 124 Q.J. ECON. 969 (2009) (presenting evidence that the salience of a tax
increases the elasticity of demand among commuters on a toll road); Brian Galle,
Carrots, Sticks, and Salience, 67 TAX L. REV. 53, 54 (2013); David Gamage, On
the Future of Tax Salience Scholarship: Operative Mechanisms and Limiting
Factors, 41 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 173, 175–76 (2013); David Gamage & Darien
Shanske, Three Essays on Tax Salience: Market Salience and Political Salience,
65 TAX L. REV. 19, 20 (2011); Jacob Goldin, Note, Sales Tax Not Included:
Designing Commodity Taxes for Inattentive Consumers, 122 YALE L.J. 258 (2012)
(arguing that salience is essential for modifying consumer behavior); Andrew T.
Hayahsi, The Legal Salience of Taxation, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. 1443 (2014)
(investigating salience effects for homeowner property taxes); Hayes R.
Holderness, The Unexpected Role of Tax Salience in State Competition for
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taxation in the United States has been a manufacturer’s
excise, the FAET, which presumably impacts retail prices for
purchasers, but is the least salient form of tax. This undersalience may explain in political terms why the tax has
remained so stable (unchanged for several decades), despite
the partisan divide on firearm policy, and why the tax has
had no obvious effect on consumer behavior. In contrast, the
retail excise taxes on firearms and ammunition in Chicago
and Seattle are hyper-salient, at least politically, and may
trigger not only price sensitivity in consumers, but also
organized boycotts among the community of would-be
purchasers. It would be useful and informative to our public
discourse to have empirical studies about the marginal
effects of manufacturer excise tax increases. At what
threshold would incremental increases in FAET rates impact
consumer decisions? What effect do manufacturer excise
taxes, at the margins, have on the manufacturers’ decisions
about productivity and supply, their capacity to fund
lobbyists, or shareholder decisions about divestment? Would
more pervasive retail excise taxes on firearms do more to
reduce gun prevalence and gun violence than manufacturer
taxes, because they are more salient to purchasers, or would
they be less effective, due to their political salience?
Regarding retail excise taxes, is there a threshold percentage
(identified from studying excise taxes on other products) that
triggers observable price sensitivity or elasticity, or a knee of
the curve that triggers a significant market constriction?
The question of salience for retail-versus-manufacturer
excise taxes overlaps with questions about Tiebout-model
competition between jurisdictions.77 For retail excise taxes
Businesses, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 1091 (2017) (applying salience to Tieboutian
competition); Rachelle Holmes Perkins, Salience and Sin: Designing Taxes in the
Sin Era, 2014 BYU L. REV. 143, 144 (2014); Peter C. Ordeshook, Property Tax
Consciousness, 34 PUB. CHOICE 285 (1979) (finding no salience effect for property
mortgage payments including property taxes); Deborah H. Schenk, Exploiting the
Salience Bias in Designing Taxes, 28 YALE J. ON REG. 253 (2011).
77. For discussion of tax salience in the Tiebout context, see Reuven S. Avi-
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on guns and ammunition, at the state or local level, would
the Tiebout competition model predict a race to the bottom,
in which jurisdictions are afraid to adopt taxes they
otherwise would due to the loss in business? Or would the
model suggest a race to the top, where jurisdictions compete
for policies that lower gun violence? I cannot find a single law
review article addressing this question as a general
proposition, but a Tieboutian race-to-the-bottom scenario
would be a powerful argument for federal retail taxation.
Scholars conversant in Tieboutian analysis could also help
inform us about whether state preemption statutes, which
bar municipalities from adopting local taxes or restrictions
pertaining to firearms, arise from state-level concerns about
a race to the bottom or a race to the top. Some have suggested
that it is neither—that the preemption laws instead arise
from the inherent political tension between the rural
districts and the urban centers in many states, and that the
urban-versus-rural conflict is behind the political gridlock on
gun policy in general.
Another question that merits more commentary from tax
law professors is the Pigouvian nature of gun taxes, both the
extant federal taxes and potential state or local taxes—that
is, whether this is a “sin tax,” designed to discourage
activities that impose externalities on society.78 The NFA tax
on machine guns and silencers (sometimes known as the
“transfer tax”) was indisputably Pigouvian, designed to
make the weapons completely unaffordable at the time. On
the other hand, the FAET (10% on handguns, 11% on rifles
and ammo) is less clear, because the statute earmarks the
revenue from the tax for the promotion of wildlife
Yonah, Globalization, Tax Competition, and the Fiscal Crisis of the Welfare State,
113 HARV. L. REV. 1573, 1626–28 (2000); Robert H. Sitkoff & Max M.
Schanzenbach, Jurisdictional Competition for Trust Funds: An Empirical
Analysis of Perpetuities and Taxes, 115 YALE L.J. 356, 416–18 (2005).
78. For example, David Hemenway has suggested that “government
authorities could tax the sales of the current lethal handguns or subsidize
production of the less lethal weapons.” HEMENWAY, supra note 2, at 140.
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conservation and sports hunting. It is unclear whether its
original purpose was primarily to raise revenue for good
uses, or to discourage sales of dangerous weapons, or both.
Seattle claimed that its tax was primarily for raising
revenue, but the revenue disappointed, as the tax drove
down the sales volume. Pigouvian taxes often run into this
problem—advocates of a sin tax tout the revenue that it will
generate for the jurisdiction, but the tax disincentivizes the
activity enough to suppress the tax revenues below expected
levels. Pigouvian taxes also involve enforcement and
monitoring costs that policymakers may not appreciate ex
ante. From a legal standpoint, the more explicitly a
legislature frames a gun tax as a “sin tax,” and the more the
tax falls on individuals rather than manufacturing firms, the
more likely it seems that a Second Amendment challenge to
the law would find traction, though most of the Second
Amendment challenges to gun laws after Heller have proved
unsuccessful.
There is lively debate in the top law reviews lately about
the merits and drawbacks of Pigouvian taxes,79 their
effectiveness at changing consumer behavior (bounded by
inelasticity of demand), implementation costs versus
revenues, over- and under-inclusiveness, the sticky question
of government paternalism, and so forth—but so far there
has been no empirical research about Pigouvian gun taxes,
unfortunately. One forthcoming article by Samuel Brunson
advocates for a gun ownership tax to raise revenue for
79. See Fleischer, supra note 75 (against Pigouvian taxes); Jonathan S. Masur
& Eric A. Posner, Toward a Pigouvian State, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 93 (2015)
(enthusiastically advocating for more Pigouvian taxes); see also Giuseppe DariMattiacci & Gerrit De Geest, Carrots, Sticks, and the Multiplication Effect, 26
J.L. ECON. & ORG. 365 (2009); Brian Galle, Tax, Command . . . Or Nudge?:
Evaluating the New Regulation, 92 TEX. L. REV. 837 (2014); Brian Galle, The
Tragedy of the Carrots: Economics and Politics in the Choice of Price Instruments,
64 STAN. L. REV. 797 (2012); Aaron M. Levine & Joshua C. Macey, Dodd-Frank Is
a Pigouvian Regulation, 127 YALE L.J. 1336 (2018); Nadav Shoked, Cities Taxing
New Sins: The Judicial Embrace of Local Excise Taxation, 79 OHIO ST. L.J. 801
(2018).

2019]

SCHOLARSHIP ON FIREARM POLICY

1473

compensating victims but disclaims “true” Pigouvian policy
of deterring gun purchases.80 Nevertheless, there remains
the unanswered problem of the tax being self-defeating as a
revenue source. From the standpoint of disincentivizing
socially costly behavior, however, some “sin taxes” have been
successful. “Abundant evidence shows the effectiveness of
one specific policy, alcohol taxation, which reduces the
overall population level of alcohol consumption and alcoholrelated problems.”81 Even consumers that we think of as
impulsive—youth, alcoholics, and even heavy drinkers—
demonstrate price sensitivity, and consume less when
alcohol taxes are higher.82
Black markets are a problem for Pigouvian taxes
(consumers can avoid the tax via illegal providers),83 and are
a special problem for gun taxes, because guns are a durable
good that black market vendors can repurchase and resell
many times (obviously this is less true of ammunition), a
frequently made point in debates about gun control. The
durable nature of guns also means that legal secondary
markets (private exchanges and barter) can undermine the
success of a Pigouvian gun tax—but the legal secondary
market can also undermine the black market at the same
time, which makes the question more complex. The
secondary market problems (both legal and illegal) with
Pigouvian taxes are not necessarily insurmountable or
absolute. Depending on the circumstances, effective law
enforcement can hamper illegal markets,84 as can voluntary

80. See generally Brunson, supra note 74.
81. HEMENWAY, supra note 2, at 195.
82. See id.
83. See generally UNDERSTANDING THE U.S. ILLICIT TOBACCO MARKET:
CHARACTERISTICS, POLICY CONTEXT, AND LESSONS FROM INTERNATIONAL
EXPERIENCES (Peter Reuter & Malay Majmundar eds., 2015).
84. See id. at 139–60 (describing and evaluating enforcement interventions in
illegal tobacco markets).
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compliance by the citizenry.85 Effective marketing
campaigns by manufacturers and retailers undermine legal
secondary markets, winning over customers to new product
sales instead of the used/pre-owned private exchanges.86
Currently, many consumers still buy new firearms (a few
million per year), even when used models are widely
available at discount prices. Speculators—those who buy up
an item before an excise tax or ban goes into effect, and who
then hoard it to achieve monopoly rents later—can have an
enormous impact on the supply and prices in secondary
markets, both illegal and legal, and in theory could collapse
a fragile black market. The complex effects of taxes on the
relationship between primary and secondary markets is a
topic that tax experts could readily address—but they have
not yet done so. Black markets for guns may also have a selfdefeating feature of making the guns a consumable good
rather than a durable good, if criminals do not want to
purchase a gun already linked to other crimes.
Tobacco black markets can provide instructive examples,
even though cigarettes are consumables, because the black
markets exist primarily, if not entirely, to avoid cigarette
taxes.87 According to a comprehensive study by the National
Academy of Sciences, within the United States, the illegal
tobacco market consists of bootlegging cigarettes from lowtax states to high-tax states,88 and this could be an issue with

85. See id. at 130–35 (describing the effectiveness of public education
campaigns in reducing black markets for tobacco).
86. See id. at 174–88 (proposing a similar approach to address black markets
in tobacco).
87. Id. at 1 (“In comparison with other consumer products, cigarettes are
currently subject to high taxes in the United States and in most other countries.
The high rates of taxation and the large tax differentials between jurisdictions
increase incentives for tax evasion and tax avoidance and contribute to existing
illicit tobacco markets.”).
88. See id. at 2–3. Interestingly, the size of the illegal tobacco market is
difficult to determine, as with firearms, due to similar data deficits and rival
methodologies for calculating. See id. at 4–5.
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state or local firearms taxes as well. Internationally, there is
also a problem with illegal/unregistered production,
counterfeiting of expensive foreign brands, and large-scale
smuggling of imports89—issues that are less likely to affect
the American domestic gun market, given that Heller
eliminated the possibility of an outright gun ban. One of the
most effective policy interventions to combat domestic illegal
tobacco markets is to regulate and monitor (control) the
supply chain—manufacturers, distributors, and retailers.90
This requires cooperation and coordination between various
levels of government and various agencies within each level,
which historically has proved difficult with tobacco,91 but
with firearms would require significant changes in current
laws that prohibit such coordination and information
sharing, between federal agencies and state-federal
counterparts. Digital stamps, and tracking/tracing is very
effective
when
implemented
consistently.92
Tax
harmonization, of course, eliminates the primary motivation
for the illegal tobacco market,93 but in the United States, this
requires a complete federalization of the taxes for that
market, which presents both constitutional and political
hurdles with both tobacco and firearms. Public education
campaigns have also proved effective in the United States at
reducing tobacco use generally, but the campaigns have not
focused on discouraging illegal markets.94 Other countries
have run education campaigns to discourage the public from
buying illegal cigarettes, and the effectiveness of these
campaigns requires further study.95 Enforcement of the laws

89. See id. at 3–5.
90. See id. at 111–26.
91. See id.
92. See id.
93. See id. at 127–30.
94. See id. at 130.
95. See id. at 131–36.
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is crucial—the National Academy of Sciences (NAS)
concludes that low enforcement of anti-bootlegging laws in
the United States has enabled a flourishing illegal market;96
cigarette enforcement is a low priority for state and federal
law enforcement agencies.
The lessons for firearm tax proposals seem clear: federal
action may be necessary to avoid an interstate bootlegging
industry. In addition, new tax initiatives, apart from raising
the current manufacturer’s taxes, would also require a
strong political commitment to have greater oversight of the
supply chain, and more consistent enforcement for
violations. These problems seem endemic to Pigouvian taxes,
but the NAS has not taken the position that we should
abandon such tax efforts. Pigouvian taxes on guns have
promise, even if there are significant challenges for
implementation.
Victor Fleischer’s article about Pigouvian taxes devotes
a few pages to gun taxes, which he portrays unfavorably.97
His argument rests on the wide variation he sees in the
marginal social cost of different gun owners—a hypothetical
good citizen (whom he describes as a not-so-hypothetical law
professor and Second Amendment scholar named Eugene)
and a hypothetical cocaine dealer named John, with the gun
tax affecting everyone equally.98 Fleischer argues that the
former type of gun owner poses no social costs with his gun
ownership (in fact, he asserts that there are positive
externalities), while the latter poses high social costs
(violence and so forth), but he is both less common and less
responsive to the proposed tax.99 This is the familiar
argument that gun regulations merely take guns away from
the virtuous, law-abiding citizens, and leave them in the
96. See id. at 140–58.
97. See Fleischer, supra note 75, at 1677–79.
98. Id.
99. Id.

2019]

SCHOLARSHIP ON FIREARM POLICY

1477

hands of the vicious, lawless criminals.100 Assuming the
“good” potential gun owners are the majority—a moral
majority—and the criminals a smaller minority, the social
costs of the policy (to the moral majority) far outweigh the
benefits, that is, deterring criminals.101
There are several problems with this line of argument.
The first is the commonplace but entirely false dichotomy
between the “good” people in our society and the “criminals.”
Our hypothetical law-abiding, law-expounding professor
named Eugene may seem perfectly congenial and harmless
at the moment, but no one is permanently immune from
moral lapses, or from developing a substance abuse problem
(highly correlated with gun suicides and homicides), or
experiencing a series of financial setbacks that lead to
desperation, or even somewhat unreasonable, mistaken acts
of self-defense. This risk, even if less than probable, still
constitutes a social cost of “good” citizens owning guns—more
of those “good citizens” resort to violent or illegal activity
than we like to admit to ourselves. And more of those
“criminals” are the troubled teenage children or siblings of
law-abiding “good” citizens than we like to admit—instead,
the gun discourse in our culture persistently invokes
“criminals” as “other.” In other words, I worry that there are
no friendly civilians, at least in terms of potentials.
Moreover, an estimated half million guns per year disappear
from theft and enter the illegal gun market, and this is also
a social cost of the moral, law-abiding citizen politely
exercising his Second Amendment rights. There exists an
elaborate distribution infrastructure for lawful gun
purchases—a wide network of licensed retailers,
manufacturers’ regional distribution centers, gun shows, and
online orders of replacement parts, plus the surrounding
advertising and marketing campaigns to let consumers know

100. See id.
101. See id.

1478

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 67

about the availability and pricing of products. This market
infrastructure, for all its merits, simultaneously and
inevitably facilitates the availability of guns to the black
market, through straw purchasers, backdoor illegal sales
from authorized dealers, and so forth. There is also a moral
hazard problem—a person who buys a gun for self-defense
then feels safer, even empowered, and is therefore more
likely to take risks (say, visit high-crime neighborhoods he
would have avoided if unarmed), or respond more
aggressively to threats. Our public discourse often blames
the “mentally ill” for the high-profile incidents of gun
violence, with the purported solution being that we should
focus on keeping guns away from “crazy people.” But I worry
that owning or carrying a gun makes even the best of us
slightly less rational, a little more brash or overconfident or
“crazy” than we otherwise would be. The moral hazard
involved in arming oneself is a social cost that offsets (to an
unknown extent) the social benefits of being able to prevent
a crime.
I have the opposite set of concerns about our imaginary,
demonic “criminals” who magically have an endless supply
of cheap, black market guns regardless of the restrictions or
levies placed on the primary gun market. First, I do not
believe that most criminals who obtain a gun illegally have
set out to murder people—I think many want one merely as
a precaution, in case they need to defend themselves
unexpectedly, but then things go wrong. Thus, it is not clear
how many of the current pool of illegal gun purchasers are so
determined to obtain a gun that they are indifferent to
changes in the supply or price; many may forego the firearm,
and use a less lethal weapon (a knife, etc.) if the price or
transaction costs for obtaining an illegal gun rose
significantly. We do not have empirical evidence proving that
criminal demand for guns is inelastic. Moreover, criminal
defendants are disproportionately poor, and the regressive
effects of price increases on the poor (the marginal impact)
should make criminals more sensitive to prices than the rest
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of the population, not less. The regressive nature of
Pigouvian taxes is a common criticism, but in the case of
guns and criminals, the regressive aspect of it might be
desirable, given the correlation between violent crime and
poverty.102 On the other hand, to the extent that the demand
for firearms or ammunition is inelastic—not price
sensitive—then a tax on these items can be an effective
revenue source for the public fisc, unlike many other items
subject to Pigouvian taxes.
Early in his hypothetical, Fleischer asserts that
hypothetical Eugene’s gun ownership “arguably creates
positive social externalities for his neighbors.”103 How so? Do
Eugene’s neighbors want him to be a neighborhood vigilante,
brandishing his weapons at anyone he perceives to be
committing a crime against his neighbor’s property? If
Eugene’s neighbors have an acrimonious relationship with
him—say, over the neighbor’s dog that barks too much, or
Eugene’s loud music, or their opposing party yard signs
during election season—would they view Eugene’s household
arsenal as a benefit to them? If Fleischer’s stereotypical
portrayal of the criminal is accurate—that is, a violent man
determined to obtain firearms, and willing to pay any price—
then neighbors may see Eugene’s gun collection as an
attractive nuisance, a treasure trove for any burglar patient
enough to strike when Eugene is not home. Rather than
scaring criminals away from the neighborhood, a stockpile of
weapons seems just as likely to draw them in.
Returning to the main point of this section: taxation of
firearms and ammunition is a subject that deserves far more
academic attention than it has received, especially from
those with expertise in tax law and policy. Our public

102. In fact, given the demographics of gun ownership, a firearm or
ammunition tax might actually be a luxury tax, rather than a sin tax, and have
redistributive effects.
103. Fleischer, supra note 75, at 1677.
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discourse would benefit from a better understanding of both
the current tax regime with its effects, and well theorized
proposals for increases, shifting the point of taxation, and so
forth.
B. Defensive Gun Use
Self-defense touches every part of the gun policy
debate—it is a primary motivation for handgun
ownership,104 the core of the NRA’s arguments, and has
become the postmodern reading of the Second
Amendment.105 It is perhaps the largest empirical hole in
public discourse on guns106—nobody truly knows how often
gun owners use their weapons to stop a crime or defend
themselves,107 and therefore we have many baseless
assumptions and speculation about how effective guns are

104. Kate Masters, Fear of Other People Is Now the Primary Motivation for
American Gun Ownership, a Landmark Survey Finds, THE TRACE (Sept. 19,
2016), https://www.thetrace.org/2016/09/harvard-gun-ownership-study-selfdefense/.
105. See, e.g., Teixeira v. Cnty. of Alameda, 873 F.3d 670, 677 (9th Cir. 2017),
cert. den. 138 S. Ct. 1988 (2018) (“After Heller, this court and other federal courts
of appeals have held that the Second Amendment protects ancillary rights
necessary to the realization of the core right to possess a firearm for selfdefense.”); Binderup v. Att’y General, 836 F.3d 336, 363 (3d Cir. 2016) (noting
self-defense is “the right at the ‘core’ of the Second Amendment,” citing District
of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 629–30 (2008)); Ezell v. Cty. of Chicago, 651
F.3d 684, 708 (7th Cir. 2011) (deciding based on “the core right to possess firearms
for self-defense”); Bridgeville Rifle & Pistol Club, Ltd. v. Small, 176 A.3d 632, 646
(Del. 2017) (“Heller made clear that the Second Amendment protects an inherent
right of self-defense.”); People v. Wilder, 861 N.W.2d 645, 649 (Mich. Ct. App.
2014) (“The Second Amendment . . . guarantee[s] an individual ‘a right to keep
and bear arms for self-defense.’”); see also BLOCHER & MILLER, supra note 27, at
72–84 (discussing the constitutionalization of self-defense through Heller and
subsequent judicial opinions).
106. See RAND, supra note 29, at 8–9; David Hemenway, Survey Research and
Self-Defense Gun Use: An Explanation of Extreme Overestimates, 87 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 1430, 1431 (1997); see also David Hemenway & Deborah Azrael,
The Relative Frequency of Offensive and Defensive Gun Uses: Results from a
National Survey, 15 VIOLENCE & VICTIMS 257, 269 (2000).
107. See RAND, supra note 29, at 8–9; Hemenway, supra note 106, at 1431.

2019]

SCHOLARSHIP ON FIREARM POLICY

1481

for self-defense compared to other measures, or whether the
social welfare gains from defensive use outweigh, or even
offset, the social costs of gun prevalence.108 The more-gunsless-crime trope implies that gun ownership itself—in the
aggregate—prevents crimes, crowding out analysis of actual
instances of gun use.109
RAND
has
acknowledged
this
in
emphatic,
disheartening terms—all the information circulating about
salutary gun usage is incorrect, or at best unreliable.110
Earlier estimates came from methodologically flawed
surveys of crime victims (representing a narrow selection of
crimes), or gun owners themselves, relying on respondents’
own opinions about how often their guns have prevented a
crime.111 In other words, the gun owner’s opinion about
whether a crime would have otherwise occurred, whether
their display (or even mere possession?) of a gun thwarted a
crime, and so on. The surveys do not include responses
(obviously) from those who used a gun defensively but died
during the incident.112 RAND researchers identify two yetunanswered questions: the true number of defensive gun use
incidents per year (we still lack a good method to count such
incidents), and whether defensive gun use is effective
compared to other responses or defensive measures against

108. See RAND, supra note 29, at 8–9. See also FIRMIN DEBARANDER, DO GUNS
MAKE US FREE? 75–88 (2015) (discussing in detail the historical ascent and
consequences of stand-your-ground-laws).
109. See Ian Ayres & John J. Donohue III, The Latest Misfires in Support of
the “More Guns, Less Crime” Hypothesis, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1371, 1372 (2003). See
generally Ian Ayres & John J. Donohue III, Shooting Down the “More Guns, Less
Crime” Hypothesis, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1193 (2003).
110. See RAND, supra note 29, at 275–80 (describing the widely ranging
estimates and the methodologies used in each published study, most or all of
which depend on self-reporting in surveys).
111. See id. For an excellent overview of the leading work in this area, and the
failings of each, see HEMENWAY, supra note 2, at 66–69.
112. RAND, supra note 29, at 275–80.
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crime.113 After surveying all extant studies, they conclude
that there is no conclusive evidence on the latter question.114
Finally, the RAND researchers note some other issues that
skew results in the studies: whether the would-be criminal
also had a firearm (RAND suggests many of the “effective”
defensive gun use scenarios involved an unarmed criminal
and gun-wielding potential victim), and whether defensive
gun use occurs only in the subset of circumstances where the
gun owner has a chance to draw or display the weapon, which
may correlate to other advantageous factors (e.g., advance
warning of the crime, an assailant distracted by bystanders,
police backup available, and so on).115 Relatedly, a certain
percentage of defensive gun use incidents involve an
unarmed victim wrestling the firearm from a would-be
assailant, and turning it on the perpetrator;116 for purposes
of researching the social benefits of gun ownership, it would
seem that such incidents should count separately from those
where a gun owner uses their own weapon.
The incomplete data about defensive gun use currently
leaves open the possibility that it is incredibly rare. For
example, significant empirical survey evidence that selfdefense with weapons other than firearms occurs far more
often than defensive gun use; baseball bats have more
reported uses in successful self-defense than guns.117 In
addition, as John Donohue et al. recently observed:

113. See id. at 273.
114. See id. at 284–85.
115. See id. at 283–84; see also State v. Scott, 819 S.E.2d 116 (S.C. 2018)
(stating that a reasonable mistake can justify lethal force for self-defense); COOK
& GOSS, supra note 21, at 17–20.
116. See, e.g., Chloe Alexander, Tow truck driver wrestles gun from robbery
suspect, shoots him several times, KHOU-11 (May 26, 2019), https://www.khou
.com/article/news/crime/tow-truck-driver-wrestles-gun-from-robbery-suspectshoots-him-several-times/285-6eadfd85-7a0f-4e90-87e1-2d6ef363691b?fbclid=Iw
AR2Bu6TdN147l4Mrg4wpuITuWhjfcA115T1Fuzz5aoHwQyVQ9V_uyIYUSPw.
117. HEMENWAY, supra note 2, at 77.
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In any event, the use of a gun by a concealed carry permit holder to
thwart a crime is a statistically rare phenomenon. Even with the
enormous stock of guns in the United States, the vast majority of
the time that someone is threatened with violent crime no gun will
be wielded defensively. A five-year study of such violent
victimizations in the United States found that victims reported
failing to defend or to threaten the criminal with a gun 99.2 percent
of the time—this in a country with 300 million guns in civilian
hands [(citation omitted)]. Adding 16 million permit holders who
often dwell in low-crime areas may not yield many opportunities for
effective defensive use for the roughly 1 percent of Americans who
experience a violent crime in a given year, especially since criminals
can attack in ways that preempt defensive measures.118

Some claims of defensive gun use are, in fact, illegal.119
Some involve mutual combat (e.g., an argument between
relatives or neighbors escalates to a violent encounter),120 or

118. Donohue et al., supra note 25, at 202.
119. See, e.g., People v. Williams, 87 N.E.3d 353, 360 (Ill. App. Ct. 2017)
(concluding that a mistaken belief of being in danger negated a self-defense
claim); State v. Guillory, 229 So. 3d 949, 964 (La. Ct. App. 2017) (“A person who
is the aggressor or who brings on a difficulty cannot claim the right of self-defense
unless he withdraws from the conflict in good faith and in such a manner that
his adversary knows or should know that he desires to withdraw and discontinue
the conflict.”); State v. Fitts, 803 S.E.2d 654, 654 (N.C. Ct. App. 2017) (“Defendant
did not intend to kill victim when he discharged firearm into victim’s vehicle, and
thus defendant was not entitled to jury instruction on perfect self-defense.”);
State v. Chandler, 99 N.E.3d 1255, 1259 (Ohio Ct. App. 2017) (affirming that the
defendant could not assert a Castle Doctrine self-defense claim in felonious
assault prosecution with regard to a shooting at a common area of an apartment
complex).
120. See, e.g., Goodson v. State, 824 S.E.2d 371, 372 (Ga. 2019) (concluding that
the defendant’s claim of self-defense was unavailing when he shot victim (an
argumentative neighbor) as he turned to flee, and continued shooting after the
victim was on the ground and no longer posed any threat); Mack v. State, 428
P.3d 326, 328 (Okla. Crim. App. 2018) (concluding that although the defendant
claimed that when an argument started with the victim, he mistakenly thought
the victim was armed, and “[a]n aggressor, or a person who voluntarily enters a
situation armed, cannot claim self-defense.”); Braughton v. State, 569 S.W.3d
592, 604 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018) (concluding that the defendant who shot the
unarmed attacker who was arguing with and hitting his father in front of their
house had an ineffective claim of self-defense or defense of others); Farrow v.
State, 437 P.3d 809, 818 (Wyo. 2019) (“[T]wo individuals who mutually agree to
fight are both considered aggressors, making a self-defense theory unavailable to
either of them.”). For a concise academic discussion of the escalation problem, see
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defensive gun use by someone who cannot legally possess or
use a firearm (e.g., convicted felons and others under
statutory prohibitions).121 Similarly, imagine an individual
whose family member alleges some mistreatment or threats
from a bully (or romantic rival, or violent ex-boyfriend, or
loan shark), and who accosts the bully later, warning him at
gunpoint to “leave my family/daughter/girlfriend alone.”122
This would be a crime in every state, but many gun owners
may consider this a legitimate instance of their gun
preventing a crime.123 In a study in 2000, researchers at the
Harvard Injury Control Research Center collected
summaries of defensive gun use incidents and sent them to
state
judges
in
California,
Pennsylvania,
and
Massachusetts—who deemed about half of the incidents as
illegal or contrary public policy, even when they assumed all
the individuals legally possessed their firearms in the first
place.124 As one Miami police chief observed, “citizens feel
threatened all the time, whether it’s from the approach of an
aggressive panhandler or a squeegee pest or even just
walking down a poorly lighted street at night. In tightly

HEMENWAY, supra note 2, at 71.
121. See, e.g., Stanfield v. State, 269 So.3d 1188, 1190 (Miss. 2019) (concluding
that the defendant was a convicted felon, who wrestled to take away an attacker’s
gun, causied it to fire and kill the assailant, but “self-defense is not a viable
defense to the crime of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon.”); State v.
Perrier, 536 S.W.3d 388, 402 (Tenn. 2017) (holding that the felon-in-possession
of firearm was “engaged in unlawful activity” and could not claim valid selfdefense in shooting); see also DEBARANDER, supra note 108, at 85.
122. See, e.g., People v. Bennett, 96 N.E.3d 74, 83 (Ill. App. Ct. 2017)
(concluding that the defendant no longer faced danger of imminent harm when
he shot and killed victim, which negated the defendant’s self-defense claim); see
also DEBARANDER, supra note 108, at 81.
123. See Donohue et al., supra note 25, at 201–06 (recounting tragic incidents,
starting with the notorious case of Bernard Goetz and Gerald Ung).
124. See HEMENWAY, supra note 2, at 72–73. The Challenges of Defining and
Measuring Defensive Gun Use, RAND CORP. (Mar. 2, 2018), https://www.rand
.org/research/gun-policy/analysis/supplementary/defensive-gun-use.html (citing
David Hemenway et al., Gun Use in the United States: Results from Two National
Surveys, 6 INJ. PREVENTION 263, 263–67 (2000).
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One promising newer nonprofit project for data collection
about defensive gun use is the Gun Violence Archive
(“GVA”),126 “an online archive of gun violence incidents
collected from over 6,500 law enforcement, media,
government and commercial sources daily in an effort to
provide near-real time data about the results of gun
violence.”127 Most of the items reported come from news
reports (links provided), which presents both advantages and
disadvantages for researchers; note that the GVA reports
only shootings, not incidents where a potential victim
brandished a firearm to ward off a would-be attacker, thief,
or intruder. The GVA tallies for reported incidents of
defensive shootings are 1,887 for 2018; 2,106 for 2017; and
2,001 for 2016.128
Empirical researchers in other fields need law professors
to help define the boundaries before they can plan their
research.129 Legality or criminality is the first question that
we in the legal academy must answer for our counterparts in
other fields (public health, sociology, criminal, political
science, and risk assessment/insurance actuarial science)—
that is, what types of defensive gun use are legal, as opposed
to criminal.130 These researchers need the answer framed to
125. DEBARANDER, supra note 108, at 81.
126. See GUN VIOLENCE ARCHIVE, www.gunviolencearchive.org (last visited
Oct. 19, 2019). This page devoted to day-by-day defensive gun use incidents is
available at: https://www.gunviolencearchive.org/reports/defensive-use, and is
kept up-to-date. GVA has no affiliation with other entities or advocacy groups.
127. See About, GUN VIOLENCE ARCHIVE, https://www.gunviolencearchive.org
/about.
128. See Past Summary Ledgers, GUN VIOLENCE ARCHIVE, https://www.
gunviolencearchive.org/past-tolls (last visited Oct. 19, 2019).
129. See COOK & GOSS, supra note 21, at 19 (explaining the need for definitions
before conducting an empirical investigation of defensive gun use).
130. But see McGriff v. State, 160 So. 3d 167, 168 (Fl. Dist. Ct. App. 2015)
(concluding that the defendant had no duty to retreat before using deadly force
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help suggest an empirical study design. Law review articles
often focus on policy suggestions—what we think the law
should be, what we think courts, legislators, or government
officials should do about something. The immediate need in
the area of firearm research, however, is clearer explanation
of the binary variables that researchers should use in
designing their studies—descriptively, what factors make
use of lethal force, or even brandishing a weapon, always
illegal, or definitely legal, even if these per se categories are
the exception, not the norm.131 We need to explain, with a
view to research design, the problem with mistakes of fact in
self-defense claims, or the duty to use non-lethal force first
before escalating.132 On the more normative side, law
professors should weigh in on the question of whether we
should count a case as legitimate self-defense if the
individual is a felon,133 or if the type of weapon itself is
illegal134 (say, a machine gun, a handgun with a silencer,

in self-defense, even if he was engaged in unlawful activity).
131. See, e.g., Savage v. State, 166 A.3d 183, 198 (Md. 2017) (concluding that
expert testimony that defendant would be more likely to perceive himself to be
facing imminent threat under conditions of chaos and stress, and thus have
greater difficulty controlling his reactions, was inadmissible under Frye, and
therefore could not support self-defense claim).
132. See COOK & GOSS, supra note 21, at 19–20.
133. Compare State v. Perrier, 536 S.W.3d 388, 392–93 (Tenn. 2017)
(concluding that a felon-in-possession of firearm was therefore “engaged in
unlawful activity” and could not claim valid self-defense in shooting), with
Wallace v. State, 216 So. 3d 464, 474 (Ala. 2015) (concluding that a felon in
possession could raise self-defense, but could not use “stand-your-ground”
statute), Miles v. State, 162 So. 3d 169, 171–72 (Fl. Dist. Ct. App. 2015) (finding
that the defendant was not precluded from relying on “Stand Your Ground law”
to claim that he had shot victim in self-defense, and thus was immune from
prosecution, even though he was carrying a concealed weapon and was a
convicted felon in possession of a firearm at the time of the shooting), and People
v. Dupree, 771 N.W.2d 470, 478–80 (Mich. Ct. App. 2009) (finding that a felonin-possession still has right to raise self-defense in response to murder charge).
134. See, e.g., United States v. O’Brien, 560 U.S. 218, 234 (2010) (concluding
that under a statute prohibiting the use or carrying of a firearm in relation to a
crime of violence or drug trafficking crime, the fact that the firearm was a
machinegun was an element of the offense to be proved to the jury beyond a
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etc.).
A second immediate task for legal commentators is to
explain or translate some of our legal terms of art into factors
or variables for research design. For example, there is a
confusing series of Supreme Court cases interpreting the
terms “use”135 and “carry”136 in firearm-related statutes;
awareness of the issues with terminology would help
researchers in the social sciences avoid using the same words
differently in designing their studies, either in formulating
survey questions or in explaining their findings. Similarly,
through grading of offenses and sentencing factors, criminal
law imputes significance to the fact that a perpetrator

reasonable doubt, rather than a sentencing factor); Castillo v. United States, 530
U.S. 120, 121 (2000) (concluding that a statute prohibiting the use or carrying of
a “firearm” in relation to a crime of violence, which increased the penalty when
weapon used or carried was a “machinegun,” used the word “machinegun” and
similar words to state an element of a separate, aggravated crime).
135. See, e.g., Watson v. United States, 552 U.S. 74, 76 (2007) (trading drugs
for a gun does not “use” a firearm during and in relation to drug trafficking
crimes, within meaning of statute); Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 616
(1998) (concluding that the petitioner may not challenge whether his plea was
intelligent, but may appeal on grounds of actual innocence, over confusion
regarding legal definition of “use” of firearm); Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S.
137, 143 (1995) (concluding that “use” includes brandishing, displaying,
bartering, striking with, and firing or attempting to fire a firearm, or even
referring to a firearm in one’s possession, but does not include the nearby
concealment of a gun to be at the ready for an imminent confrontation); Smith v.
United States, 508 U.S. 223, 225 (1993) (trading a gun for illegal drugs
constitutes “use” of firearm during and in relation to drug trafficking crime
within meaning of statute, triggering enhanced penalties for that offense).
136. See, e.g., Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125, 126–27 (1998) (finding
that the phrase “carries a firearm” is not limited to carrying of firearms on person,
but also applies to person who knowingly possesses and conveys firearms in a
vehicle, which person accompanies). See also Rosemond v. United States, 572
U.S. 65, 67 (2014) (holding that to aid and abet offense of using firearm during
federal drug-trafficking offense, defendant must know beforehand that one of his
confederates will carry a gun); Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99, 103 (2013)
(finding as to whether defendant had brandished, as opposed to merely carrying,
firearm in connection with crime of violence, because it would elevate mandatory
minimum term for firearms offense from five to seven years, was element of
separate, aggravated offense that had to found by jury).
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discharged a firearm,137 rather than merely brandishing it,
and imputes significance to brandishing it versus keeping it
holstered or hidden.138 These are after-the-fact evaluative
questions in the legal system, but they are antecedent
questions for research design.
C. State Preemption
At the time of this writing, forty-three states have
statutes that preempt most local efforts to regulate firearm
sales, usage, storage, or ownership.139 These laws are part of
a larger state preemption regime affecting environmental
regulations, land use controls, Pigouvian taxes or bans on
sweetened soft drinks, fiscal authority or public employee
pensions, public bathroom regulations, broadband services,
and so on—state laws prevent cities or counties from
adopting their own restrictions or rules about an activity.140

137. See, e.g., Dean v. United States, 556 U.S. 568, 571–72 (2009) (holding that
a 10–year mandatory minimum applies if a gun is discharged in the course of a
violent or drug trafficking crime, whether on purpose or by accident). See also
Dean v. United States, 137 S.Ct. 1170, 1178 (2017) (permitting the use of
minimum statutory sentences for gun use in commission of drug offense); United
States v. Gonzales, 520 U.S. 1, 2–3 (1997) (holding that a statutory five-year
sentence for using or carrying a firearm in relation to drug trafficking may not
run concurrently to other state sentences).
138. Legality can also turn on the question of what constitutes “during” the
commission of a predicate crime. See, e.g., United States v. Ressam, 553 U.S. 272,
274–75 (2008) (holding that defendant was carrying explosives contemporaneous
with the commission of underlying felony of making a false statement to a United
States customs official, so it was “during” the commission of the crime).
139. See VOLSKY, supra note 2, at 62; Preemption of Local Laws, GIFFORDS LAW
CENTER TO PREVENT GUN VIOLENCE, https://lawcenter.giffords.org/gun-laws/
policy-areas/other-laws-policies/preemption-of-local-laws/ (last visited Oct. 19,
2019); Preemption: State by State, GIFFORDS LAW CENTER TO PREVENT GUN
VIOLENCE, https://lawcenter.giffords.org/gun-laws/state-law/50-state-summaries/
preemption-state-by-state (last visited Oct. 19, 2019). Note that Kristin Goss
stated that forty-five states had partial or full preemption in early 2005. See
GOSS, supra note 2, at 164. For further discussion, see COOK & GOSS, supra note
21, at 108–09.
140. See Richard Briffault, The Challenge of the New Preemption, 70 STAN. L.
REV. 1995 (2018); Nestor M. Davidson, The Dilemma of Localism in an Era of

2019]

SCHOLARSHIP ON FIREARM POLICY

1489

A substantial academic literature has accumulated on the
topic of state preemption of local rule,141 and a few authors
have addressed it in the context of firearm regulations.142
State preemption laws are often a manifestation of the
tensions between rural and urban voters in many states,
which in recent decades have aligned themselves with
partisan positions on a variety of policy matters.143 In the
context of firearm policy, the urban-rural divide is
crucial144—handgun violence is mostly an urban problem,
and city governments seek to reduce gun violence and gun
prevalence, while gun sports (especially hunting), which
often involve rifles rather than handguns, are primarily
rural or suburban phenomena145—but so is the belief that
handguns are important for self-defense.146 The voting power
Polarization, 128 YALE L.J. 954 (2019); Bradley Pough, Understanding the Rise
of Super Preemption in State Legislatures, 34 J.L. & POL. 67 (2018); Erin Adele
Scharff, Hyper Preemption: A Reordering of the State-Local Relationship?, 106
GEO. L.J. 1469 (2018) [hereinafter Hyper Preemption]; Erin Scharff, Preemption
and Fiscal Authority, 45 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1270 (2018); Kenneth A. Stahl,
Preemption, Federalism, and Local Democracy, 44 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 133 (2017);
Lauren E. Phillips, Note, Impeding Innovation: State Preemption of Progressive
Local Regulations, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 2225 (2017).
141. For an overview, see generally Richard C. Schragger, The Attack on
American Cities, 96 TEX. L. REV. 1163 (2018).
142. See generally Blocher, supra note 27; Michael P. O’Shea, Why Firearm
Federalism Beats Firearm Localism, 123 Yale L.J. Online 359 (2014); John Hill,
Note, North To The Future Of The Right To Bear Arms: Analyzing The Alaska
Firearm Localism To Alaska, 33 ALASKA L. REV. 125 (2016). See also BLOCHER &
MILLER, The Positive Second Amendment, supra note 27, at 189–90.
143. See Molly Cohen, A Practical Playbook to Beat State Preemption, CITYLAB
(July 19, 2017), https://www.citylab.com/equity/2017/07/a-lawyers-playbook-tofight-state-preemption/533862/.
144. See Blocher, supra note 27, at 94–104 (discussing the rural-urban divide
regarding preemption and differing gun cultures).
145. See id.; See also Scharff, Hyper Preemption, supra note 140, at 1491–92.
146. See Matt Valentine, Disarmed: How Cities Are Losing the Power to
Regulate Guns, THE ATLANTIC (Mar. 6, 2014), https://www.theatlantic.com/
politics/archive/2014/03/disarmed-how-cities-are-losing-the-power-to-regulateguns/284220/ (“Such laws reflect a divide not only between those who favor
expanded gun rights and those who oppose them, but also a geographical divide
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of these respective constituencies in the state legislature can
lead to preemption laws about firearms. The main advocacy
groups on each side of firearm regulation see preemption as
a focal issue in their efforts—the NRA-ILA,147 National
Shooting Sports Foundation,148 the Second Amendment
Foundation,149 Gun Owners of America,150 and the Firearms
Policy Foundation151 on one side, and Everytown,152 the
Giffords Law Center,153 and the Brady Law Center154 on the
other.

between policymakers. Metropolitan communities (where most gun crimes occur)
tend to have a different perspective about gun rights and gun violence than their
more rural surrounds.”).
147. See GOSS, supra note 2, at 162–65; Firearm Preemption Laws, NRA-ILA,
https://www.nraila.org/get-the-facts/preemption-laws/ (last visited Oct. 19, 2019).
148. See, e.g., Press Release, Bill Brassard, NSSF, NSSF Tells Seattle Mayor
to Veto Gun and Ammunition Tax or Face Lawsuit (Aug. 21, 2015),
https://www.nssf.org/nssf-tells-seattle-mayor-to-veto-gun-and-ammunition-taxor-face-lawsuit/; Alert, NSSF, Anti-Gun Bill Hearing Scheduled in Nevada: NSSF
Needs Your Help in Opposing AB 291 (Mar. 28, 2019), http://www2.nssf.org/
l/127421/2019-03-28/3qzl5f.
149. Press Release, Second Amendment Foundation, SAF, Florida Carry Sue
Tallahassee For Preemption Law Violation, https://www.saf.org/saf-florida-carrysue-tallahassee-for-preemption-law-violation/ (last visited Oct. 19, 2019); Press
Release, Second Amendment Foundation, SAF, NRA Sue City Of Edmonds Over
Wash. State Preemption Violation, https://www.saf.org/saf-nra-sue-city-ofedmonds-over-wash-state-preemption-violation/ (last visited Oct. 19, 2019).
150. See, e.g., State Alert, Val Finnell, Hold Cities and Municipalities
Financially Responsible for Breaking the Law (May 1, 2019), https://gunowners
.org/paalert5119/.
151. See, e.g., Press Release, Firearms Policy Coalition, Liberty Park Press:
Seattle Mayor Signs Gun Control Ordinance Despite State Preemption, (Jul. 26,
2018), https://www.firearmspolicy.org/liberty_park_press_seattle_mayor_signs_
gun_control_ordinance_despite_state_preemption.
152. See State Firearm Preemption Laws, EVERYTOWN FOR GUN SAFETY (Feb.
18, 2018), https://everytownresearch.org/fact-sheet-preemption-laws/.
153. See Preemption of Local Laws, GIFFORDS LAW CENTER TO PREVENT GUN
VIOLENCE, https://lawcenter.giffords.org/gun-laws/policy-areas/other-lawspolicies/preemption-of-local-laws (last visited Oct. 19, 2019).
154. See, e.g., Supplemental Brief On Appeal for Brady Center to Prevent Gun
Violence as Amicus Curiae, Michigan Gun Owners, Inc. v. Ann Arbor Public
Schools, 918 N.W.2d 756 (Mich. 2018) (No, 155196).
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Rationales for state preemption are usually formalist or
functionalist.155 Formalists point to the doctrinal point that
municipalities are technically organs or subdivisions of the
state, with no inherent powers or legal independence under
many state constitutions.156 Functionalists, on the other
hand, typically emphasize the need for uniformity so that
citizens do not inadvertently violate local laws while
traveling about the state, to prevent unfairness in the form
of disparate punishments in different cities, or to prevent one
side (urban or rural) from imposing externalities on the
other.157 Arguments for localism run along similar formal
and functional lines: self-rule as an ideal (the “laboratories
of democracy” in microcosm158)159 or self-rule for pragmatic

155. See Valentine, supra note 146.
156. See, e.g., Hyper Preemption, supra note 140, at 1475–76 (“Under the
modern view, local governments are creatures of state law, and the U.S.
Constitution provides few, if any, substantive protections for local policymaking.
For the most part, local government authority is limited to those powers
enumerated in the states’ constitution and laws, and this authority is quite
limited.”).
157. See id. at 1493 (“In the absence of state-level control, state policymakers
may be concerned about the externalities that local policies impose on those
outside the local jurisdiction.”).
The NRA frames its support of preemption as an effort to simplify “a
complex patchwork of restrictions that change from one local jurisdiction
to the next.” There are just too many different ordinances, they say,
which could be confusing or inconvenient to gun owners.
“I can travel 30 minutes from my home and travel through four
jurisdictions,” explained Kansas State Rifle Association President
Patricia Stoneking, who testified in support of a new preemption bill that
would eliminate what little local authority remained after Kansas
passed a preemption law in 2007. “How am I to know what the law of all
those jurisdictions say? What their individual ordinances are?
Uniformity in all firearms laws is the most prudent action to take.”
Valentine, supra note 146.
158. See Hyper Preemption, supra note 140, at 1492 (“[A]llowing space for local
government policymaking is another way our federalist system encourages
innovation.”).
159. See id. (“[L]ocal control may improve substantive policymaking by
allowing local ordinances to reflect local needs.”).
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reasons, such as efficiency (tailoring),160 skin-in-the-game
effects,161 information costs and asymmetries,162 and
political accountability.163
Some of the state preemption laws, at least related to
firearms (but some are more general) carry a threat164—local
officials can face fines or even imprisonment for ignoring the
state preemption laws and proceeding with local rules and

160. See Hyper Preemption, supra note 140, at 1491 (“First, allowing localities
to pursue their own policy goals allows local residents to maximize their policy
preferences.”).
We have over 900 municipalities in Ohio, and often conditions and
circumstances differ from one to another, so there’s a rationale for local
governments to craft their own legislation. So that’s an argument for
providing some flexibility to the local governments with regards to gun
laws.
161. See also Valentine, supra note 146 (quoting Former Ohio Governor Bob
Taft):
California and Chula Vista assert an interest that only those with “skin
in the game,” i.e. electors, who will be affected by the measure, should
initiate the referendum process. The California state and local
governments want only civic-minded locals, who presumably would have
knowledge of local affairs and would themselves be affected by the
referendum, to participate in the initiative process.
See, e.g., Chula Vista Citizens for Jobs & Fair Competition v. Norris, 755 F.3d
671, 695 (9th Cir. 2014); Westover v. Idaho Ctys. Risk Mgmt. Program, 430 P.3d
1284, 1289 (Idaho 2018) (plaintiff arguing it was “the legislature’s intent to bring
some modicum of reasonableness to local government by requiring the
government actors to have skin in the game.”).
162. See Hyper Preemption, supra note 140, at 1493 (“Further, local
policymaking may be better in situations where locals and local officials have
ground-level expertise in both the scope of the problem and in developing
solutions.”).
163. See id. at 1492 (“For example, unlike state legislatures, which are almost
all bicameral, local government experimentation can be put in place with the vote
of the city council.”).
164. See id. at 1495–1504 (describing punitive preemption statutes); State
Firearm Preemption Laws, EVERYTOWN FOR GUN SAFETY (Feb. 18, 2018), available
at
https://everytownresearch.org/fact-sheet-preemption-laws/
(“The
most
sweeping firearm preemption laws contain onerous, punitive provisions designed
to intimidate city officials from even attempting to address gun violence.”).
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enforcement.165 The legality and prudence of such provisions
are ripe questions for academic critique.166
III. THE STATE OF COORDINATED RESEARCH INITIATIVES
A. Private Foundations and State Governments Begin to
Step In
Even though the Dickie Amendment has stifled rigorous
academic research about gun violence for the last two
decades, we are beginning to see signs of researchers
working around the problem. Private funding from
philanthropic foundations is filling part of the gap, and at
least one state (Cal.) has decided to use state funding for gun
violence research.167 This section briefly describes the
emerging research centers to make law professors aware of
these resources (ongoing and recently-published empirical
studies)—but also in hopes that readers in the legal academy
165. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-3108(I) (West 2017) (imposing personal
liability on local officials for fines up to $50,000 for intentional violations of
preemption law); FLA. STAT. § 790.331(3) (West 2001) ( subjecting local officials
to personal liability and removal from office for violating the state’s preemption
law); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 65.870(6) (West 2012) (amending Kentucky firearms
preemption statute that now criminalizes violations of the preemption law); MISS.
CODE. ANN. § 45-9-53(5)(c) (West 2015) (imposing fines on local officials who
attempt to violate preemption statute, plus attorney’s fees); see also Sarah
Holder, The Escalating City-State Battle Over Guns, CITYLAB (Apr. 18, 2018),
https://www.citylab.com/equity/2018/04/who-has-the-right-to-govern-your-guns/
558119/ (describing similar punitive measure bill pending in the South Caroline
legislature, and putting it in the context of the nationwide trend).
166. See, e.g., Fla. Carry, Inc. v. Thrasher, 248 So. 3d 253 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2018) (“[I]ssue of whether university was liable for encroachment on preemption
of firearms and ammunition regulation was not moot.”); Fla. Carry, Inc. v. City
of Tallahassee, 212 So. 3d 452 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2017) (holding that “provision
of preemption statute addressing standing to sue for violations of the statute did
not itself prohibit any activity;” and that “city ordinances were not promulgated
within meaning of the preemption statute when they were republished.”); see also
Jennifer Mascia, In Much of the Country, Cities Can’t Enact Their Own Gun
Laws, THE TRACE (Dec. 8, 2018), https://www.thetrace.org/2018/12/preemptionnra-local-gun-laws/ (describing the current preemption laws, enforcement
mechanisms, and potential legal challenges).
167. See HEMENWAY, supra note 2, at xxiv.
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will see how they themselves could fit in with some of these
endeavors.
It appears that the only law school with a research center
devoted to firearm law and policy is the new (launched in
August 2018) Center for Firearms Law at Duke Law
School,168 directed by Joseph Blocher, Darrell Miller, and
Jacob Charles. The Center focuses on “the development and
dissemination of reliable and balanced scholarship on issues
surrounding firearms, gun rights and regulation, and the
Second Amendment.”169 To this end, the Center has an online
Repository of Historical Gun Laws, which is very useful for
researchers, and helpful links to important recent
scholarship in the area.170 This is a relatively new
development—the center opened only recently.
With major funding from the Laura and John Arnold
Foundation, RAND Corporation is leading the National
Collaborative on Gun Violence Research (NCGVR),171 and it
has conducted its first RFP for research grants in early
2019.172 The RAND website has comprehensive, nonpartisan (even-handed) meta surveys of all existing
empirical research on various issues related to gun
violence.173 It is an ideal starting place for prospective
researchers in the legal academy. The RAND-NCGVR
project is in its second year.

168. See Duke Center for Firearms Law, DUKE UNIVERSITY SCHOOL
https://law.duke.edu/firearms/ (last visited Oct. 19, 2019).

OF

LAW,

169. See Second Amendment scholars Blocher and Miller co-direct new Duke
Center for Firearms Law, DUKE UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW (Feb. 12, 2019),
https://law.duke.edu/news/second-amendment-scholars-blocher-and-miller-codirect-new-duke-center-firearms-law/.
170. See id.
171. See Funders, NATIONAL COLLABORATIVE ON GUN VIOLENCE RESEARCH.
172. See Request for Proposals, NATIONAL COLLABORATIVE ON GUN VIOLENCE
RESEARCH, https://www.ncgvr.org/rfp.html (last visited Oct. 19, 2019).
173. See Gun Policy in America, RAND CORP., https://www.rand.org/research/
gun-policy.html (last visited Oct. 19, 2019).
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The Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health
has a Center for Gun Policy and Research.174 The Center
launched in 1995, and it has a public health emphasis. The
Center publishes one major empirical study per year on
average. The most recent is Estimating the Effects of Law
Enforcement and Public Health Interventions Intended to
Reduce Gun Violence in Baltimore (2018).
As mentioned above, California in 2016 became the first
state to provide state funding for gun violence research, the
University of California Firearm Violence Research Center.
The UC Davis Violence Prevention Research Program is
hosting the Center,175 which emphasizes applied, actionable
research and focuses on aspects of firearm violence that
create the largest burden for the population at large, as well
as those with particularly disproportionate effects on
population subsets.176 Initial projects are an epidemiological
study of gun violence in California, a new empirical study of
the effectiveness of rigorous background check programs
that include violent misdemeanor convictions, a new survey
of gun ownership in California, and risk factors for recurrent
gunshot injuries.177 The study published in 2018 is Firearm
mortality in California, 2000-2015: the epidemiologic
importance of within-state variation.178
The Harvard School of Public Health (T.H. Chan) has a
subdivision called the Harvard Injury Control Research
174. See Johns Hopkins Center for Gun Policy and Research, JOHNS HOPKINS
BLOOMBERG SCHOOL OF LAW, https://www.jhsph.edu/research/centers-andinstitutes/johns-hopkins-center-for-gun-policy-and-research/index.html (last
visited Oct. 19, 2019).
175. See Violence Research Program, UC DAVIS HEALTH, https://health.ucdavis
.edu/vprp/ (last visited Oct. 19, 2019).
176. Id.
177. UCFC Research Projects, UC DAVIS HEALTH, https://health.ucdavis.edu/
vprp/UCFC/index.html (last visited Oct. 19, 2019).
178. Veronica A. Pear et al., Firearm mortality in California, 2000-2015: The
epidemiologic importance of within-state variation, 28 ANNALS OF EPIDEMIOLOGY
309 (2018).
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Center, which studies, among other things, firearm injuries
from an epidemiological perspective.179 The research
publications are excellent, but the most recent is from 2013,
unfortunately, and most of the research is more than ten
years old.
Of course, there are also advocacy groups that publish
helpful reports. On the pro-gun side, the NRA-ILA reports on
recent lawsuits, legislative initiatives, Congressional
hearings, and so on, directed for gun owners and enthusiasts
(NRA members and supporters).180 The National Shooting
Sports Foundation (NSSF), which is the firearm industry’s
trade association, has an online portal of “Fact Sheets and
Backgrounders,”181
an
impressively
comprehensive
collection of reports and position papers on legislative
initiatives, lawsuits, and other policy developments. It
represents the industry perspective, so there is no attempt to
hide its bias, but the tone and emphasis is more industrycentered than the NRA’s gun-owner-centered approach.
Legal researchers would find many of these reports and
position papers informative, at least, and professionalsounding. Interestingly, the NSSF (speaking for the
industry) strongly supports legal prohibitions of straw
purchases, and has its own public-information campaign to
discourage straw purchases on behalf of those ineligible to
own firearms. 182

179. Harvard Injury Control Research Center, Mission, HARVARD T.H CHAN
SCH. OF PUB. HEALTH, https://www.hsph.harvard.edu/hicrc/ (last visited Oct. 19,
2019).
180. About the NRA Institute for Legislative Action, NAT’L RIFLE ASS’N – INST.
https://www.nraila.org (last visited Oct. 19, 2019).

FOR LEGISLATIVE ACTION,

181. Fact Sheets and Backgrounders, NAT’L SHOOTING SPORTS FOUND.,
https://www.nssf.org/government-relations/factsheets/ (last visited Oct. 19,
2019).
182. Larry Keane, Stopping Straw Purchases: Firearms, Industry, Law
Enforcement Work to Make Our Communities Safer, NAT’L SHOOTING SPORTS
FOUND. (Mar. 7, 2019), https://www.nssf.org/stopping-straw-purchases-firearmsindustry-law-enforcement-work-make-communities-safer/.
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On the other side, the Giffords Law Center (based at
Rutgers),183 the Brady Center to End Gun Violence,184 and
Everytown for Gun Safety185 have reports, position papers,
and fact sheets advocating for a variety of firearm
regulations, which update readers about legislative
initiatives and important lawsuits. The breadth of coverage
is again impressive (matching the NSSF and NRA-ILA, but
each site hits some unique issues). For example, the Giffords
Center has a clear, comprehensive discussion of the state
preemption problem, state-by-state. The Trace is an online
magazine about firearm policy—on the gun-control side—
and publishes Atlantic Monthly-quality articles and studies
(serious in-depth journalism, albeit advocacy-tilted) about
gun policy initiatives, problems or breakdowns in the current
legal framework, and so on.186
Even so, we need more in-depth rigorous legal
scholarship on areas besides straightforward Second
Amendment questions. For example, there is a dearth of
scholarly commentary on administrative law issues related
to firearm regulation—Chevron deference to the ATF, the
legality and legal effect of executive orders, the problem of
unfunded mandates for state reporting to the NICS
background check program, “red flag” or “extreme risk” laws
(confiscation of firearms from those adjudicated in an ex
parte proceeding to present a danger to themselves or
others), the problems that HIPAA privacy mandates present
for reporting patients to the NICS, judicial review of various
agency actions related to firearms and ammunition, and so
on. In the field of torts, there are the obvious topics (which

183. GIFFORDS LAW CENTER TO PREVENT GUN VIOLENCE, https://lawcenter
.giffords.org (last visited Oct. 19, 2019).
184. BRADY CENTER TO END GUN VIOLENCE, https://www.bradyunited.org (last
visited Oct. 19, 2019).
185. EVERYTOWN FOR GUN SAFETY, https://everytown.org (last visited Oct. 19,
2019).
186. THE TRACE, https://www.thetrace.org/ (last visited Oct. 19, 2019).
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received academic attention when they were new, but not
recently) of the federal statutes immunizing gun
manufacturers and gun owners from tort liability, with a
landmark decision about the PLCAA from the Connecticut
Supreme Court in March 2019.187 There are environmental
policy issues, meriting attention from legal scholars,
regarding the severe lead contamination of the ground and
air at shooting ranges, and the resulting lead poisoning of
wildlife and of people who work at or who frequent the
shooting ranges. In the criminal law field, there is now a split
among the federal circuit courts about the Second
Amendment
implications
of
felon-in-possession
188
prohibitions, but not enough legal scholarship pushing for
187. See Soto v. Bushmaster Firearms Int’l, 202 A.3d 262 (Conn. 2019).
188. See Binderup v. Att’y Gen., 836 F.3d 336, 356–57 (3d Cir. 2016) (en banc),
cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 2323 (2017) (finding the statute violated the Second
Amendment as applied). In contrast, the Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, Ninth, Tenth,
Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits have also rejected as-applied challenges, where the
defendant claimed his prior conviction was for a non-violent felony. See Medina
v. Whitaker, 913 F.3d 152 (D.C. Cir. 2019)(upholding felon-in-possession ban as
applied to nonviolent felon); Hatfield v. Barr, 925 F.3d 950 (7th Cir. 2019) (federal
statute that criminalized being a convicted felon in possession of a firearm did
not violate Second Amendment as applied to felon); Kanter v. Barr, 919 F.3d 437,
438 (7th Cir. 2019) (non-violent felon’s unsuccessful challenge to felon
dispossession statutes under the Second Amendment); Hamilton v. Pallozzi, 848
F.3d 614, 626c27 (4th Cir. 2017), cert. denied, __ U.S. __, 138 S.Ct. 500 (2017);
United States v. Rozier, 598 F.3d 768, 770–71 (11th Cir. 2010); United States v.
Scroggins, 599 F.3d 433, 451 (5th Cir. 2010); United States v. Vongxay, 594 F.3d
1111, 1115 (9th Cir. 2010); In re United States, 578 F.3d 1195, 1200 (10th Cir.
2009). On the other hand, every federal circuit court that has had occasion to
consider a facial challenge to the federal felon-in-possession statute’s
constitutionality has upheld the law. See, e.g., United States v. Bogle, 717 F.3d
281 (2d Cir. 2013) (per curiam); United States v. Moore, 666 F.3d 313, 318 (4th
Cir. 2012); United States v. Joos, 638 F.3d 581, 586 (8th Cir. 2011); United States
v. Torres-Rosario, 658 F.3d 110, 113 (1st Cir. 2011); United States v. Rozier, 598
F.3d 768, 770–71 (11th Cir. 2010); United States v. Williams, 616 F.3d 685, 692
(7th Cir. 2010); United States v. Vongxay, 594 F.3d 1111, 1115 (9th Cir. 2010);
United States v. McCane, 573 F.3d 1037, 1047 (10th Cir. 2009); United States v.
Anderson, 559 F.3d 348, 352 (5th Cir. 2009); see also Eric Ruben and Joseph
Blocher, From Theory to Doctrine: An Empirical Analysis of the Right to Keep and
Bear Arms After Heller, 67 DUKE L. J. 1433, 1481 (2018) (“This relatively low
success rate was largely due to 273 challenges to felon-in-possession statutes.
These challenges, which account for 24 percent of the entire dataset, were
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a new consensus, or giving courts guidance about which
sister circuit’s approach to adopt. In bankruptcy law, some of
the major firearms manufacturers have filed for bankruptcy
in recent years, and others are on the brink—these are
complex bankruptcy issues that deserve more academic
study from those with expertise in the field.
B. Anticipating Objections: John Lott
Recently, John Lott, a full-time advocate for firearm
prevalence, posted an unpublished article on the Social
Science Research Network website entitled Myth: Firearms
Research Fell After the NRA Restrictions on Federal
Funding.189 In this manuscript, which dates from 2014, Lott
claims to have counted the number of articles (and article
pages) published every year pertaining to firearm research
after the 1996 restrictions went into effect.190 He claims that
the number of articles remained the same, or increased,
although he admits that federal funding dropped off191 (he
also highlights the private sources of funding for such
research that were just emerging at the time, which he
claims make the research biased).192 But his methodology is
ridiculous—he merely did a PubMED search for all articles
containing the word “firearm” or “gun” anywhere in the
article, including the footnotes or bibliography.193
It is easy to find numerous articles that mention guns or
firearms are not projects about this subject, but merely
mention it in passing as one of the chronic problems that
rejected 99 percent of time and enjoyed no success at the federal appellate level
during our study period.”).
189. John R. Lott & John Whitley, Myth: Firearms Research Fell after the NRA
Restrictions on Federal Funding, CRIME PREVENTION RESEARCH CTR. (Feb. 26,
2014), https://www.ssrn.com/abstract=3295796.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id.
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plague poor urban communities, and so forth. In other words,
John Lott grossly overcounts the articles published in this
period. It also appears Mr. Lott is counting his own prolific,
repetitive publications in this count. His website claims that
he has published over 100 articles in peer-review journals,
many or most of which were during the same period; given
that he is claiming there are sixty or more articles per year
about guns, if ten of those are his, then that would mask a
large drop-off in publications by university-affiliated
researchers. This is not a matter of sophisticated statistical
models—it is as simple as doing a search for the word
“firearm” on Google Scholar and seeing the small percentage
of results that are in fact articles about firearm prevalence
or use. He also admits he included many articles about BB
guns and air guns, which are not even covered under most
state or federal gun laws.194 Near the end of his article, he
resorts to assertions like this one: “There is also the problem
that Public Health research is very poorly done, using
primitive statistics, and is filled with statistical and logical
errors.”195 A footnote offers support for this sweeping claim—
entirely from John Lott’s own writings.
In 2019, Mr. Lott began asserting in op-eds and
interviews that “The federal government has generously
funded firearms research, spending over $43 million between
2015 and 2018.”196 Mr. Lott does not provide any citations or
sources for this figure. According to government websites
like TAGGS (for NIH) and the National Institute of
Justice/Office of Justice Programs, the sums are much
smaller. The OJP lists just under $9 million in grants for
firearm or gun violence research during the period in

194. See id.
195. Id.
196. John Lott, Gun Controls Backed by Dem Presidential Candidates Would
Hurt Poor and Minorities, FOX NEWS (May 15, 2019), https://www.foxnews.com/
opinion/john-lott-gun-controls-backed-by-dem-presidential-candidates-wouldhurt-poor-and-minorities.
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question.197 The NIH total is just under $7 million198, but
most of this appears to be carryovers (annual installments)
from previously awarded grants that run for three or four
years, rather than being new awards.
As mentioned in the Introduction, in 2012, as President
Obama finished his first term, Congress expanded the
Dickey Amendment to apply to the National Institute of
Health (NIH) as well as the CDC. The two agencies are
different in size and political vulnerability—the NIH has a
much larger budget and is not subject to line-item funding
approval from Congress.199 Also, “The CDC doesn’t
completely ignore the issue of gun violence. In 2002, it
created the National Violent Death Reporting System
(NVDRS), which covers all types of violent deaths, including
homicides and suicides committed with firearms. However,
the NVDRS collects data from only 32 states.”200 After the
Sandy Hook massacre, the NIH “in 2013 announced a
funding opportunity for research examining violence, in
particular firearm violence.”201 The first two awards that
specifically addressed firearms were for Garen Wintemute’s
research efforts at U.C. Davis,202 and the one awarded to
197. Past Funding Opportunities: Closed Solicitations – Fiscal Year 2019, U.S.
DEP’T OF JUSTICE OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS (last visited Oct. 19, 2019),
https://ojp.gov/funding/Explore/PastFundingOpportunities.htm.
198. Cunningham et al., NIH Funds a Research Consortium to Address
Firearm Deaths Among U.S. Children and Teens, UNIV. OF MICH. INST. FOR
HEALTHCARE POL’Y & INNOVATION (Apr. 18, 2018), https://ihpi.umich.edu/news/
nih-funds-research-consortium-address-firearm-deaths-among-us-childrenteens; see Grants & Funding, U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., NAT’L INST.
OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. (last visited Oct. 19, 2019), https://grants.nih.gov/
funding/index.htm.
199. Rita Rubin, Tale of 2 Agencies: CDC Avoids Gun Violence Research But
NIH Funds It, 315 JAMA 1689, 1689–91 (2016) https://jamanetwork.com/
journals/jama/fullarticle/2513131?appid=scweb&alert=article.
200. Id. at 1690.
201. Id. at 1691.
202. Garen Wintemute, Alcohol, Drugs and Other Prior Crimes and Risk of
Arrest in Handgun Purchasers, NIH RESEARCH PORTFOLIO ONLINE REPORTING
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Rina Eiden, a substance abuse researcher at the University
at Buffalo; Eiden received $723 000 in fiscal year 2015 to
study the precursors of gun violence.203 The NIH provided
$11.4 million to 14 research projects related to guns and gun
violence between 2014 and 2017 as part of its Obama-era
program for “Research on the Health Determinants and
Consequences of Violence and its Prevention, Particularly
Firearm Violence.”204 Things changed after the 2016 election.
Recently, “NIH officials have noted that firearms researchers
can continue to apply for NIH funding to study gun violence
through a general application channel used by thousands of
NIH applicants,205 but these are a fraction of the pre-2017
levels. The NIH backed off from the research after President
Trump took office in 2017.206 The N.R.A. pressured Congress
and the agency to defund the research, charging that it was
biased against guns.207 Members of Congress have demanded
explanations from the NIH over discontinuing its program
after Trump’s election.208 Some of the $7 million in NIH
grants mentioned above are partial carryovers from the
Obama-era awards. Also, note that the National Institute of

TOOLS (Apr. 30, 2017), https://projectreporter.nih.gov/project_info_description
.cfm?aid=8919078&icde=27426956&ddparam=&ddvalue=&ddsub=&cr=9&csb=
default&cs=ASC.
203. Rubin, supra note 194, at 1691.
204. Meredith Wadman, NIH Directors Stand Firm on Not Renewing Focused
Firearm Research Program, SCI. MAGAZINE (Nov. 15, 2017), https://www.science
mag.org/news/2017/11/nih-institute-directors-stand-firm-not-renewing-focusedfirearm-research-program.
205. Id.
206. Meredith Wadman, NIH quietly shelves gun research program, SCI.
MAGAZINE (Sep. 13, 2017 12:13 PM), http://www.sciencemag.org/news/2017
/09/nih-guietly-shelves-gun-research-program.
207. See id.
208. Letter from Frank Mallone, Jr., Ranking Member, and Bobby L. Rush,
Ranking Member, Comm. on Energy & Commerce, to Frank Collins, Director,
Nat’l Inst. of Health (Nov. 14, 2017), https://energycommerce.house.gov/sites/
democrats.energycommerce.house.gov/files/documents/HHS.NIH_.2017.10.30%
20Letter%20re%20firearm%20violence%20research.%20HE.pdf.
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Justice (part of the OJP) makes almost $3 million in grants
during this period to the firearm industry’s trade association,
the National Sports Shooting Foundation, to help with
things like “recruitment of more hunters,” i.e., firearm
purchasers.209 The firearms industry is subsidized by federal
tax funds. Perhaps Mr. Lott is including that in his $43
million.
The only way to derive a figure like Lott’s $43 million is
to include grants from the OJP to state and local law
enforcement agencies to help with reporting information to
the NICS program, for officer training in shooting and gun
safety, or for forensics labs to aid with ballistics research. He
might also include the data-collection efforts (non-research)
by the CDC and the Bureau of Justice Statistics.
In the Preface to the 2017 edition of his book Private
Guns, Public Health, Harvard researcher David Hemenway
describes his experience with the ongoing situation at the
CDC:
Republican congressmen, at the behest of the gun lobby, have so
intimidated the CDC that the director says almost nothing about
gun violence, and the staff is afraid to say the words “guns” or
“firearms” at national meetings. On phone calls, if I mention guns
with CDC professionals, it is not uncommon for them to ask to call
me back. They then go outside so they can talk privately from their
personal cell phones.210

Hemenway also describes the current funding situation
with the National Institute of Health—for the four decades
from 1973 to 2012, the NIH awarded 486 research grants for
the following four diseases: cholera, diphtheria, polio, and
rabies—which have a combined total of two thousand
reported cases each year. Yet there were four million injuries

209. Project ChildSafe: A Firearms Safety Program of the Nat’l Shooting Sports
Found. 2017 Annual Review, PROJECT CHILDSAFE, INC. (last visited Oct. 19, 2019),
https://www.projectchildsafe.org/sites/default/files/Project%20ChildSafe%20201
7%20Annual%20Review.pdf.
210. HEMENWAY, supra note 2, at xv.
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from firearms during the same period, and the NIH funded
just three research grants.211
CONCLUSION
In March 2019, Andrew Morrall, the RAND-based
director of the National Collaborative on Gun Violence
Research, testified before a House Appropriations
Subcommittee on Labor, Health and Human Services,
Education, and Related Agencies to make the case for federal
funding of gun violence research.212 It was the first House
Appropriations hearing dedicated to the funding issues since
1996.213 The testimony focused on the current lack of
scientific evidence to support policies about gun violence (on
either side), and the potential for high quality research to
inform policy development in this area. The federal
government provides fifty times as much funding for
research about other causes of deaths that kill similar
numbers of people.214 “Even basic questions like whether gun
free zones deter or attract gun violence, or whether childaccess prevention laws prevent gun owners from defending
themselves in emergencies have not been rigorously
studied.”215 One month later, the House Appropriations
Committee approved $50 million for the CDC to conduct
scientific research to reduce injuries from gun violence.216 Of
211. See id. at xv–xvi.
212. Reducing Disagreements on Gun Policy Through Scientific Research and
an Improved Data Infrastructure: Hearing before the Subcomm. On Labor, Health
& Human Servs., Educ., & Related Agencies, 116th Cong. 1 (2019) (statement of
Andrew Morrall, Director, National Collaborative on Gun Violence Research).
213. Collaborative Director Outlines Need for Gun Policy Research Before
Congressional Subcommittee, NAT’L COLLABORATIVE ON GUN VIOLENCE RESEARCH,
(Mar. 7, 2019) https://www.ncgvr.org/news/2019/andrew-morral-congressionaltestimony.html.
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Press Release, Appropriations Committee Releases Fiscal Year 2020
Labor-HHS-Education Funding Bill (Apr. 29, 2019), https://appropriations.house
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course, it remains doubtful that the Republican-controlled
Senate would approve the allocation.217
In the meantime, law professors can commence work and
help fill in the gap. As we produce useful scholarship, authors
and law review editors should make special efforts to
disseminate the research in this area without cost to
researchers in other fields and to the public, as the Harvard
Law Review currently does with its recent archives on its
website, or through online portals like the Social Science
Research Network and Bepress. In other words, not behind
a paywall.
Law professors at major universities may underestimate
the problem and how it stymies both interdisciplinary
research and data-driven policymaking.218 Universities
typically provide their law faculty with free, unlimited access
to ScienceDirect, JStor, and Hein databases, a convenience
that we take for granted.219 Conversely, researchers in other
.gov/news/press-releases/appropriations-committee-releases-fiscal-year-2020labor-hhs-education-funding; Rachel Roubein, House Panel Allots $50M To Study
Gun Violence, POLITICO (Apr. 29, 2019, 5:07 PM), https://www.politico.com/
story/2019/04/29/house-gun-violence-study-1292456.
217. Jessie Hellmann, House Dems Propose $50 Million To Study Gun Violence
Prevention, THE HILL (Apr. 29, 2019, 4:56 PM), https://thehill.com/
policy/healthcare/441229-house-democrats-propose-25-million-for-cdc-to-studygun-violence (It’s unclear whether the Republican-controlled Senate would
approve legislation that provides funding to study gun violence.).
218. See Joi Ito, The Quest to Topple Science-Stymying Academic Paywalls,
WIRED (Jan. 4, 2019, 3:46 PM), https://www.wired.com/story/ideas-joi-itoacademic-paywalls; see also Jose Beduya, Documentarian: Take Down Paywalls
with Open Access to Scholarship, THE CORNELL CHRONICLE (Dec. 4, 2018),
http://news.cornell.edu/stories/2018/12/documentarian-take-down-paywallsopen-access-scholarship. See generally PAYWALL: THE BUSINESS OF SCHOLARSHIP
(Utopian Turtletop Productions 2018) (“[P]rovides focus on the need for open
access to research and science, questions the rationale behind the $25.2 billion a
year that flows into for-profit academic publishers, examines the 35–40% profit
margin associated with the top academic publisher Elsevier and looks at how that
profit margin is often greater than some of the most profitable tech companies
like Apple, Facebook and Google.”).
219. Perhaps validating my point that the legal academy is unaware of the
paywall problem that besets our counterparts in other disciplines, I could not find
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fields (sociology, public health, and so on), advocacy groups,
state-level policymakers, influential bloggers, and
journalists often do not have free access to Westlaw or Lexis
databases for law review articles. As outlined above,
empirical researchers in other fields who wish to study gun
prevalence, predictors of gun violence, and so on need ex ante
theorization from the legal academy to frame their studies
appropriately; and they need easy access to our work.
Research-driven firearm policy is an inherently
interdisciplinary endeavor.
Public access to scholarship on firearm policy should be
a factor in our decisions about where or how to publish final
works, or at least could be an added provision to the
publication agreements we have with law reviews. Similarly,
law professors who have high-readership blogs should
commit to directing readers’ attention to high-quality
emerging scholarship about gun policy.
There is an additional role for law faculty besides
publication of traditional law review articles. We have
opportunities to participate in amicus briefs when firearmrelated legislative initiatives face court challenges. Even
more importantly, or at least more urgently, law professors
have opportunities to participate in legislative drafting
projects, either on their own, at their state legislature, or
through collectives like the American Law Institute, the
Uniform Law Commission, and various thinktanks—a
crucial last step that social science researchers are unlikely
to do.

a single article in a traditional law review even mentioning the issue.

